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Educational Theory....

FIRST PRINCIPLES FOR A MODERN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

FOURIER AS PHILOSOPHER

THE PEIRCEAN SCHOOL

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Educational Theory

Vol. V January, 1955 No. 1

FIRST PRINCIPLES FOR A MODERN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

BY EARL C. CUNNINGHAM

"OUTLINE FOR ME THE MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS IN A MAN'S WORLD-VIEW and I will outline for you the patterns which his institutions are most likely to be like," is a rather accurate way to epitomize the role of philosophy in human affairs. Social institutions, unless haphazard, are operational externalizations of assumptions which are thought to be basic and structural to the nature of things.

As used in this study "world-view" means a synoptic summary of beliefs and assumptions which men form around such concepts as the following:

1. The origin, nature, and destiny of the universe;
2. The origin, nature, and purpose of man;
3. The origin, nature, and limits of knowledge; and
4. The origin and nature of value.

Further, and as used in the study, "First Principles" means the specific assumptions men project as answers to such general concepts as listed above under "world-view". These first principles, in turn, provide meaning, purpose, and direction for institutional development.

Three things are proposed in this study: *First*, because the presuppositions of this proposed philosophy of education stand in opposition to traditional or Aristotelian presuppositions, and because the current attack on education stems out of an apparent move to re-establish Aristotelian assumptions, Part I is a summary statement of Aristotelian *first principles* as these are related to the above world-view concepts; *Second*, Part II is an attempt to pour meanings into the above world-view concepts in ways which are consonant with modern empiricism; and Part III is a statement, in synoptic form, of assumptions which serve as first principles for our proposed philosophy of education.

EARL C. CUNNINGHAM is a Professor of Philosophy at State Teachers College, Kirksville, Missouri, and during his current leave of absence is on the faculty of the College of Education, University of Illinois. *In this article, modern empirical views are first stated by way of contrast with Aristotelian metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology, and then used as a guide for the development of a theory of education. For previous articles by Dr. Cunningham, the reader is referred to the April and October issues of* EDUCATIONAL THEORY *for 1952.*

PART I.—ARISTOTELIAN FIRST PRINCIPLES

Traditional educational philosophy grew out of an amazing complex of ideas—to insist that it is strictly Aristotelian in origin would be inaccurate. Aristotle, Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, are but a few who had a "hand" in our traditional philosophy. However, for reasons of convenience, we are going to speak of this complex as Aristotelian. We turn to a summary of the following Aristotelian first principles:

On the origin, nature, and destiny of the world. The universe is brought into completed and static existence through motion imparted to primitive matter (potentiality) by Pure Form (God). God surrounds the cosmic spheres and maintains them in motion by his eternal activities.

The universe is a heirarchy of levels. At one end is the passivity of sheer matter. Through an ascending order of form-and-matter one reaches the highest level, which is Pure Form. Form, which is self-energizing, is purposive and teleological. Everything in nature is *directed* toward a *final* purpose. Realization of capacities, which are predetermined by Form, becomes the end of the animate and inanimate world. Nature is under the permanent control and guidance of a transempirical God or Form.

On the origin, nature, and purpose of man. Man is simply an admixture of *form and matter*, with a preponderance of form, the main differentia of which is rationality. Man's origin is bound up, of course, in the initial activity when Pure Form imposed particularized forms on inert matter.

Man has a soul, which is divided into three parts: the vegetative, the will, and reason. Reason is the guiding agency. Since the cosmos is teleological, and since reason is the chief differentia setting man apart from the animal world, and since the *final purpose* of everything in nature is the realization of capacities, then the final purpose of man is realization of his capacity of rationality . . . . The Platonic-Christian variant on this must be noted: Man is a special creation of God; the rational element in man is structurally independent of matter; and the ultimate destiny of the soul of man is restoration to its original home in Plato's perfect world or the Christian heaven.

On the origin, nature, and limits of knowledge. The essence of Form is rationality. By virtue of the preponderance of form over matter, man is at the top of the hierarchy of created things in the natural world. Now since form is characterized by rationality and since man is predominantly form, he is, therefore, predominantly rational. But to be a rational animal is to be a *thinking* animal; and to think one must have a method—thus, Aristotle develops his science of logic. Aristotelian *science* will stand further examination.

a. The inductive process is ancillary to his science. Induction serves only to find particular cases through which the active reason is able to intuit *universal* and *necessary* principles.

b. These universal principles once intuited, are unqualifiedly true. Form, when apprehended through reason, is infallible. *Truth is absolute.*

c. As stated under the nature of the world, the active reason intuits that nature is a hierarchy of forms with Pure Form at the top and approaching sheer matter at the bottom. Now these forms (common nouns) are static *classes of things*. Knowledge of nature becomes an elaborate system of classifying particulars into pre-determined classes. (The principle of classification being purposive, not arbitrary.) *Knowledge thus becomes absolute.*

d. Scientific method presupposes absolute primary truths. The big job of Aristotelian science is *deduction* of specific truths from absolute general truths through the instrument of the syllogism.

e. A later Christian application of these Aristotelian principles again seems apropos: Deriving their *universal* and *necessary* truths from Biblical revelation, the Scholastics also arrived at *absolute* particular truths through an application of the "science" of Aristotle.

On the origin and nature of value. Both traditional philosophers of education and the Scholastics rejected the *golden mean* of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and turned to the absolutistic systems of Plato and Augustine. We must look to these for our guide: Morality is grounded (with Plato) in a perfect, transcendent world. The *real* world is this transcendent world—Justice, Beauty, Truth, Righteousness, the Good, *all* are immutable ideas existing in the perfect world. Through Plato's doctrines of *remembrance* and *participation*, man's reason enables him to know these perfect Ideas. Mundane morality is thus patterned after the perfect Ideas. Thus, through reason *man may know that moral standards are absolute, immutable, eternal.* The Christian tradition grounds its morality differently but arrives at the same place with Plato: *Values are eternal.*

Summary of Aristotelian First Principles:

1. The world came into being through the activity of a *prime mover.*
2. The world is teleological throughout.
3. Everything in nature has a purpose or function. This function is realization of super-imposed capacities.
4. Man is a rational being. His chief function is realization of his capacity of rationality.
5. In the Platonic-Christian pattern, man, standing in unique relation to God through special creation, finds his chief aim in eternal salvation.
6. Truth is an absolute.
7. Moral standards are absolutes.

Part II.—A Contemporary World-View

The origin, nature, and destiny of the universe. Our assumptions concerning the origin of the universe are governed by two criteria: (1) The concept of *parsimony*, and (2) knowledge, to be genuine and informative, must be capable of *public* verification.

We are not concerned with origins. We prefer to accept the universe as a *given*. So far as we are concerned, it has always been. Traditional Aristotelians reject this because, as they argue, that which will cease to be, at one time did not exist; if at one time it did not exist, then it could not be the efficient cause of itself. Since everything we know in the world of sense at one time did not exist, then we must posit an unmoved First Cause to get the universe in original motion.

We reject this Aristotelian-Thomistic argument on the grounds of parsimony and reaffirm our assumption that the universe is a given. We reason as follows: Explanations should not be expanded beyond necessity. *Somewhere* in the causal series of explanation of origins of the universe *we must stop arbitrarily*. Aristotelians insist upon positing an unknown to explain a known. We prefer to stop before we begin—that is, arbitrarily, with what is given in primary experience, which is the known world. . . . Since our data are all of a phenomenal nature, we insist that warrantable inference will not permit us to posit a noumenal or transempirical order. Hence, the world of nature is all we can know, and, since it is all that we know, we will keep our generalizations within our data. This yields only a natural order which must be accepted as a given.

We accept Heraclitean change or flux as providing the most reliable picture of the world, with this qualification: Heraclitus posited a *law* of change behind the phenomena of change. We would delete this law of change and describe the universe as one of flux—not through necessity, but from empirical observation. Natural laws are statistical generalizations. There is nothing in the principle of causation which allows us to assume either immutability or inevitability of natural law. It is, as Hume so aptly expressed it, expectancy based on habit. The only necessity is psychological expectancy. This in no sense disturbs the concept of uniformity of nature, nor does it lessen or impair the predictive function of law. It simply recasts both uniformity and predictability in terms of probabilities. This point of view affords us a universe that yields only problematic knowledge; *never certainty*.

The fundamental stuff of the universe is atomic.[1] All that happens is change within atomic structure and function. Differences in things are purely quantitative and due to chance organization of atomic elements. Existence can be attributed only to that which is quantitatively measurable.

The universe is characterized by novelty. We deny the Aristotelian-Christian concept of a completed, static, closed world, wherein the only change possible is, as Dewey writes, ". . . the monotonous traversing of a previous plotted cycle. . . ."[2] We prefer to affirm a world which is open at both ends; where "potentiality" actually means the emergence of the new; where "development" may mean new forms, mutations, novelty; wherein classes are not fixed and wherein variability is limited only by chance arrangements and combinations of elements.

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[1]We prefer to follow Karl Pearson's concept of the atom: "Atom and molecule are intellectual conceptions by the aid of which physicists classify phenomena and formulate the relationships of their sequences." *Grammar of Science, p. 95.*

[2]*Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 58.

Regarding the destiny of the universe we can only surmise: If the principle of the conservation of energy proves to be correct, then nothing can be destroyed. If the principle of entropy is correct, energy is slowly being dissipated and lost. It may be that in an infinitely variegated universe for every action there is a counter action—if this be true we could well be back into the Heraclitean "strife of opposites" where organization and disorganization oppose each other and thus maintain a relative equilibrium . . . . But of one thing we feel relatively certain, whatever does happen, and anything can, it can be explained in terms of mechanics. Certainly we find no empirical evidence to support the traditional view that the world is moving toward some predetermined ethical end.

On the origin, nature, and purpose of man. Man is a cosmic accident. A fortuituous collocation of atoms combined and organized in a unique way. He is an emergent from and a part of nature in the same sense as are other species in the animal kingdom. He did not have to be, except in retrospect. Somewhere along the vast reaches of evolutionary time, chance, variable mutations favorable to survival occurred, and, through the hereditary transmission of these favorable survival characters, the cosmic stage was set for his eventual emergence. . . . And so man is, as Randall writes, ". . . a tiny speck on a third-rate planet, revolving about a tenth-rate sun, drifting in an endless cosmic ocean." [3]

Man is nature at the level of self-consciousness. There is no reason to attempt to set him apart as non-continuous with evolutionary processes. In a sense, man's rational capacity is no more unique than the wings of a bird or the fins of a fish. Each of these followed particular adaptive, selective routes in the struggle for existence; each developed adequate survival organs.

Again, we reject the teleological explanation that birds have wings so they can fly; man has rational capacities so that he can reason. Rather, birds fly because they have wings; man reasons (if he does) because he has rational capacities. Any qualitative uniqueness man has—such as being created only a little lower than the angels—he can ascribe to his own self-laudatory proclivities.[4]

This is no attempt to belittle man's remarkable capacities—his artistic and literary creations, his towering philosophical structures, his inventive genius. It is argued here that perhaps man's greatest capacity is his ability to recognize the limits of his rational competency and to stay strictly within those limits.[5] By nature, man's rational ability is limited. Maturity demands that all we can do when faced with this fact is to acknowledge and to accept it. As Spinoza once argued, either man is rationally competent or he is not: If he is, he needs take no recourse in external forces; if he is not, then he is unable to take recourse in external forces. In either case, recourse to external forces is unwarranted. In our philosophy we choose to affirm man's rational competency while admitting its limitations.

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[3]Randall, John Herman, *The Making of the Modern Mind*, p. 226.

[4]Observe his modesty in classifying himself as a *Primate!*

[5]Perhaps this is what Korzybski meant by the suggestive title of his book, the *Manhood of Humanity*. Certainly this is the meaning of Comte's Positivism.

The only purposes man has are those he sets for himself. As we have already said, he is a cosmic accident. Inanimate nature is indifferent to his being or not being. We reject the old biological assumption that nature is concerned with perpetuating the species. We hold nature to be neutral. Man is a purposing animal. He evaluates his existent world and judges conditions as desirable or undesirable. If undesirable, he can project meliorative programs by which to attain desired goals, etc. We must maintain a sharp differentia between cosmic purposes *for* man and man as the *proposer* of purposes. We reject the former; we accept the latter.

On the origin, nature, and limits of knowledge. The organism at birth is a *tabula rasa.* We reject completely the concept of *a priori* knowledge. We will grant a Kantian *a priori* of *capacity*, but must reject his specific faculties and categories—which are patterned after Aristotle.

Knowledge begins with sensory experience and must always be reducible to it. Knowledge is not of objects of the external world but with relations which the observer established with the external world. It is meaningless at the present time to speak about "knowing things as they really are." We know "things" only in relation.

The organism is active and selective in the learning process. In a strict sense the learner becomes a part of the known. In our opening sentence in this section we spoke of the *organism* as a *tabula rasa.* We approach learning here somewhat as a Gestaltist—as interaction between the organism and the enviromental complex. When seen in this manner, "mind" loses its substantive character and becomes participial or adverbial.

Assuming the empirical nature of knowledge, several qualifications seem apropos:

One, non-empirical explanatory concepts (hypotheses) must possess predictive functions which can be verified by observation and experiment.

Two, elaborate controls are necessary for empirical discovery.

Three, empirical discovery is relative to the range of data, to available measuring devices, and to prevailing systems of explanation and interpretation.

Four, empirical discovery must always be subjected to further empirical verification as the ranges of data, etc., are altered.

Five, empirical discovery can yield only problematic solutions.

Six, empirical truth flows out of satisfactory consequences which are the outgrowth of relations between projected hypotheses and controlled methods of verification.

Seven, since man is a *biological* organism concerned with adaptation and adjustment to his environment, and since he is a *rational* organism capable of differentiating between actual existents and desired optimal ideals, knowledge (know-how) becomes an *instrument* through which man seeks to reconstruct his environment in terms of his desired, ideal ends—this is in no sense a limiting concept; the most abstruse subjects can find a niche in this system.

Eight, since knowledge is instrumental, we indicate a most vigorous concern with the methodologies and operations by which it is established. For these methods and operations we turn to the canons of scientific research.

On the origin and nature of value. Our system of ethics is tied in with and flows from certain assumptions found in the above sections. For the sake of clarity we indicate these assumptions:

1. The natural order comprises the totality of things;
2. Man is a chance emergent in the evolutionary process;
3. At birth, the organism is a *tabula rasa*, but with rational and idealizing capacities; and
4. Intelligence constitutes man's chief differentia from the rest of the animal kingdom.

Man makes his ideals, his values. A thing is valuable because it is valued. From our point of view these ideals should not be formed in a vacuum, but at the points of tension where men experientially are confronted with the inadequacies of existents, and where they envision what they believe to be the more optimally desirable. An ideal, then, stands for what an individual or a group would like to have in preference to what they actually do have.

This interpretation of the ideal leads, of course, to a plurality of "goods" or ends. It negates any universalized, unitary good such as found in Plato or Christianity. There is not The Good, but a multitude of *goods*. And these *goods* are shifting, moving, changing—coming into and going out of experience as the exigencies of life force or neutralize the individual's attention. . . .

This interpretation of ideals makes moral good atomic—nominalistic—individualistic. Good is not a noun however much philosophical idealists have sought to make it one. "Good" is meaningless unless identified with specifics. . . . As William James once wrote, *to be good a thing or a quality must be so judged for definite*, assignable, reasons.

Further, and flowing from our atomic conception of "good", is the added assumption that since each good is unique, then each good is of equal worth within every other good. Any arbitrary, qualitative heirarchy of goods breaks down. As Dewey writes, ". . . every moral situation is a unique situation having its own irreplacable good. . . ."[6]

A moral situation arises where the individual is confronted with alternative possibilities, and where these alternatives pose issues which involve the welfare of the individual[7]. Decision becomes moral when the question of "oughtness" is asked: which alternant *ought* I choose? We are willing to let this sense of oughtness carry the weight of a Kantian categorical imperative, except that we demand the right to stipulate the "why" of the ought. To this we proceed.

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[6]*Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 163. The author wishes to acknowledge a very deep indebtedness to Dewey for the present development. Dewey develops the same point of view in his *A Common Faith*.

[7]This may be applied with equal cogency to any self-determined group or community.

We stipulated earlier that man's chief differentia is rationality. There is no better place to begin applying intelligence than in moral situations. "Applying intelligence" means that the individual explores possible or probable consequences of each alternant; that he ponders and deliberates; that he walks clear around the problem so as to face every angle of implication; that he contrives hypotheses; and that he searches for methods for testing these hypotheses. As Dewey writes,[8]

> "Reason, always an honorific term in ethics, becomes actualized in the methods by which the needs and conditions, the obstacles and resources, of situations are scrutinized in detail, and intelligent plans of improvement are worked out."

Intelligence is most productive of desired consequences when it operates under a system of experimental and verifiable controls—controls which arise in experience and are justified through further experience.

The fact is that a moral good is a consequent of a plan of action. One can never know, except *a posteriori*, that a plan of action will result in a moral good. But we are operating on the assumption that an assumed good (that which we project into the future as anticipated good) is much more likely to turn out to be a good (*a posteriori*) if selected and pursued in terms of intelligent method.

Moral action or behavior is thus shifted from non-reflective, habitual conformity to externally imposed "laws", to intelligently thought out methods. This use of the intelligence is best exemplified in the canons of scientific method. . . . This brings us back to our earlier question, "Which way *ought* I to choose?" And our categorical imperative is, "*I ought to choose the way of systematic intelligence.*" If one will do this in morals he is most likely to find that consequences will take care of themselves. *It may be that attaining the good is more a matter of method than anything else.* . . .

It is at this point of intelligent method that modern religious humanism and liberal protestantism break down: they see with clear insight the hiatus between existent social practices and more optimal possibilities—the liberal protestant assures us that "if people will just love one another all these problems will be solved;" while the humanist seems content to beat the drums for a generalized, utopian "good life". Neither has been able to see, apparently, that the moral situation can be resolved only by specific methods of intelligence. They still try to solve moral problems either by citing cliches or applying generalities. We believe that they can be solved best through controlled intelligence as expressed in scientific method.

PART III.—Some First Principles for a Modern Philosophy of Education.

In this part of our study we are concerned with two projects: a summary statement of proposed First Principles for a philosophy of education that is highly sensitized to the methods and attitudes of modern science; and an indication of the patterns that such assumptions would impose upon the operating school.[9]

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[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 174.

[9] The actual development of a school program predicated on such a body of assumptions lies outside the scope on this study.

To the first of these projects we now turn.

Summary of First Principles:

THE WORLD

1. The world is an empirical given. It is a man's home.
2. Nature is neutral concerning man's hopes and aspirations.
3. The essence of nature is *process*.
4. Natural laws are statistical generalizations, capable of yielding uniformity and predictability.
5. Nature can be "bent" to serve human purposes.

MAN

1. Man is a part of and continuous with nature.
2. Man is nature at the level of self-consciousness.
3. Knowledge *qua* knowledge must meet the test of public verifiability.
4. Knowledge is limited, tentative, and problematic.
5. Knowledge is power—an instrument to serve man's adaptive and reconstructive needs.

VALUE

1. Values arise from two sources: (1) individual preferences, and (2) social acceptance.
2. Values are simply preferred ways of judging experiences.
3. Values are relative and contextual.

Educational Implications. In a process world, where the only certainty resides in statistical probability, a fixed, static educational curriculum presupposes a fixed static world. A process world demands a continuous reconstruction of curricular offerings. These reconstructions are not arbitrarily made, but emerge from novel needs brought about through change. . . .

In some instances, there may be a relatively high degree of permanency in some curricular offerings. If this is true, the permanency grows out of *continuing need* and not from subject-materials *per se*.

In the second place, achieving ends in a process world demands a different kind of attack from that employed in achieving ends in a fixed world. . . . In a fixed world lessons are learned once, and this learning is good throughout time and space.[10] In a process world, solutions to problems must vary directly with variables that change may have introduced into the situation. In a process world, *method* becomes the practical invariant. . . . And by "method" we mean a plan of attack which uses all the ingenious resources of applied intelligence—best exemplified in scientific method and made famous by Dewey's complete act of thought.

[10]Witness the rigidity of Aristotle's "scientific" classifications. *Fixed Forms* into which particular species are permanently classified—with *no* provision for emergents or mutants or novelty.

If our thesis that the world is one of process is accurate, there simply aren't any fixed answers that can be universally applied. . . . It would seem that our only recourse in curriculum building is to foster and encourage the development of a method, the habitual use of which will enable the student to attack novelty with confidence and assurance; *that if there is an answer to a given problem it will most likely yield itself up to systematic method, intelligently applied.*

The above points demand selectivity in subject matter offerings.[11] Let us recall that man is a biological animal concerned with the daily problem of adjustment to novelty. It is argued here that there are some subjects which can open more doors for the growing child than others can open. Our proposed philosophy of education frankly and openly demands that subject matter areas be screened thoroughly before being given status in a public education curriculum. Universal, public education in the United States should not strive to produce scholars,[12] but rather to produce boys and girls whose educational experiences will enable them better to do the things they must do in order to live in the twentieth century as we in America know it. Knowledge for knowledge's sake, a must for gentlemen of past centuries, is a luxury in which most American boys and girls can ill afford to indulge. Subject matter was made for children; not children for subject matter.

Again we stress that man is a biological animal. For this study, this animal is a *unitary* thing—it responds as a unit; it lives as a unit. For purposes of logical analysis we speak of intellect, of will, of emotions—*we must remember that these are logical distinctions and that the organism behaves organismically, as a totality.*

This demands that we educate for living in its complex entirety. Historically, emotions have been "played-down", and the intellect has been "played-up" in educational thinking. This bifurcation of personality cannot be justified in terms either of biology, logic, or psychology. . . . Perhaps the concept of the "whole-child" is not a cliche as some would have us believe. The enriched, functional curriculum would seem to be a *must* in our proposed philosophy of education.

Earlier, we expressed the Baconian idea that knowledge is power. We reaffirm this in our proposed philosophy of education. . . . The major problems faced by most of the youngsters passing through our schools into adult life are of an intensely practical nature—as simple as providing food, clothing, shelter, and medical attention, *et cetera*, for themselves and their families. It is literally a biological problem of adjustment and sometimes of survival. To be worthy of its name, public education must buttress, reinforce, undergird, and strengthen these youngsters in the areas where they most need buttressing, etc. It is argued here that certain kinds of knowledge yield more power than other kinds of knowledge.

Our philosophy stresses depth in subject-matter competency; but by the same logic it stresses high selectivity of such subject-matter in terms of functional value. Knowledge is a form of power that should yield its possessor higher capacity for efficient, effective, every-day living.

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[11]Some readers, no doubt, will be quick to jump on this and call it "anti-intellectualistic."

[12]The writer is inclined to be Platonic at this point of education for scholars. Provision should be made for scholars, of course.

In our theoretical discussion on values we indicated that values arise through individual preferences and social agreements. We propose that *self-interest* is the hub around which the total life of the individual revolves. Biological adaptations and survival measures are rather deeply buried in man, but nonetheless we believe that these are the cardinal problems before each individual.[13] Altruism is viewed, basically, as a necessary means (at times) in furthering one's own self-interests. We share the philosophy of government which sees political organization as a means of protecting and furthering individual rights.

The above point of view could be expanded, but our purpose here is to indicate the relation between such a philosophy of value and a functioning school program.

First, we would promote a school program that aims at individual self-realization; *second*, since man lives gregariously, our school program would emphasize that self-realization must be achieved in relation to other selves—from this would flow attitudes of *enlightened* self-interest. . . . From such an approach one suspects that the virtues which western culture emphasizes, such as cooperation, loyalty, team-work, fair-play, integrity, respect for the rights of others, etc., would emerge, the chief difference being a frank admission that the whole moral enterprise is grounded on self-interest.

A point of failure in the rather sentimental, romantic morality of contemporary Christianity is the fact that it predicates moral action on altruism; in terms of service to others, etc. Why should one be "good" ? Why should one behave in an altruistic way toward another? The answer so often given is that "you are your brother's keeper."

First and foremost, biologically, we are our own keeper. People will respond to self-interest much more quickly than to altruistic demands. The results, in so far as moral action is concerned, will most likely be the same, but there is a basic difference in the psychology of presentation—self-interest having greater motivating force than other-interest.

That which promotes the welfare of the individual is moral. But the welfare of the individual is not in a self-contained vacuum. It is in a social milieu. Therefore, an egoistic morality has its social implication.

We most strenuously argue for the following point of view: Traditional morality has always stood at right angles to man's actual desires and habits—if human life is conceived as a continuing horizontal line, then morality is a vertical line cutting through the horizontal line. *This approach produces the anomolous situation wherein the good is not desired.*

In the writer's opinion *the good should be desired* for the simple reason that the good is a means to self-realization. *The good*, then, instead of cutting at right angles to the desired, *should parallel the desired.*

Traditionally, we have said that the man who is *good* is the man who *denies* himself. To say the least, this is a very poor teaching device. Not many people buy stock in a company that promises to curtail their financial interests and possibilities. (*Continued on page 15*)

[13]Our interpretation would make room for Nietzsche's will-to-power and to Schopenhauer's will-to-live.

DEWEY'S CONCEPTION OF EDUCATION FOR GROWTH

BY FREDERICK E. ELLIS

PERHAPS THE CHIEF VALUE growing out of the heightened controversy on public education is the fundamental question which undergirds discussion, namely, what are the long-term goals or objectives of education? Almost forty years ago John Dewey, in a familiar passage in his *Democracy and Education*, declared that:

> "Our net conclusion is the life development, and that developing, growing is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, this means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming."

Since there is nothing to which growth is relative except more growth, Dewey maintained "there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education." The foregoing statement is extremely ambivalent, it makes of education an end in its own right as well as a means. The question is still unanswered—why do we educate? Toward what goals is our teaching directed?

External Goals as a Limitation of Education

At the turn of the century Dewey had written in *My Pedagogic Creed* that the child "becomes an inheritor of the funded capital of civilization." The term "funded capital" as Dewey used it connotes an inheritance, an accumulation, a selective, tested fund of experience by which further experience is to be measured. Funded capital is not a conglomerate, hit-and-miss fashion, of untested, unanalyzed experience but rather a careful selection of that which is most worthful and rewarding. Dewey adds further that education must be thought of in terms of the continuous reconstruction of experience. Again, one must have some basis for reconstruction, for reorganization, and for transforming. One can hardly reconstruct experience *in vacuo;* criteria must be set up against which one's experience may be checked. In *My Pedagogic Creed* Dewey stated that:

> "To set up any end outside of education, as furnishing its goal and standard, is to deprive the educational process of much of its meaning, and tends to make us rely upon false and external stimuli in dealing with children."

Just why the erection of ends outside of education as directive goals should deprive the educative effort of much of its meaning or that it should tend to make us rely upon false stimuli is not at all clear. Dewey himself seems to have sensed the inadequacy of his thesis when he pointed out that "the adjustment of individual

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activity on the basis of . . . social consciousness is the only sure method of social reconstruction." The concept of a social consciousness implies, to use Dewey's term, a funded capital—those principles which elevate and enrich man rather than lower and degrade him. Dewey seeks through education to form "a certain character as the only genuine basis of right living." Through much of Dewey's writing he alludes to the direction in which society should move, yet disclaims and even impugns any ends or reference points external to education. Dewey concludes the Pedagogic Creed by referring to the teacher as the prophet of the true God who ushers in the true kingdom of God. Ends external to education are surely implied in these words. However, as Dewey pointed out in *The Quest for Certainty*, values do not pose a problem for the intellect in the sense that they exist as something to be discovered through human inquiry. They arise in the context of experience, or rather, they are wrested from experience and are shaped and regulated in the interests of society. Their regulation in the interests of society does not require that "the interests of society" be antecedently derived as criteria for judging the worthfulness of values. The validity of ideals, for example, consists not in their pre-existence but rather in the consequences to which they give rise when implemented in human experience. That is to say, one does not need to justify the validity of value by reference to some supra-experiential principle. For Dewey, the so-called moral law is not an abstract principle but rather a concise statement pointing the direction toward which one must respond when confronted by specified conditions. As Dewey indicated in his *A Common Faith*, the essence of religion is the realization of the manifold possibilities of existence and loyalty to them rather than acceptance of the immediate and the given. Religion should concern itself with the values of the future and not dissipate itself upon fruitless speculation about the nature of an antecedently righteous being.

CERTITUDE AS UNWORTHY OF PHILOSOPHY

Dewey has been so preoccupied with applying philosophy to the making of a better world that he has neglected or has been impatient with those aspects of the problem of knowledge where knowledge is other than scientific. A. N. Whitehead summed it up when he remarked that the final chapter of philosophy is the search for the unexpressed presuppositions underlying the beliefs of finite human intellect. Dewey would be the last person to deny that the achievement of certainty in one's knowledge or the recognition of that to which we can give unqualified devotion—the search for truth—is not an unworthy desire. Loyalty to the facts of experience should be both real and compelling and along with it should go that tentativeness of mind which encompasses what new data the future may disclose. But Dewey is loathe to acknowledge the values which inexorably underlie his educational and philosophic thinking.

As Bertrand Russell observed, Dewey equates knowing and thinking. The process of thinking through to a desirable conclusion is, for Dewey, the same as knowing. He is unconcerned with the traditional question, namely, is the real knowable? For him truth is what happens to an idea with reference to future events. May not truth also be simply taking account of that which is, without regard whatever to future consequences?

In *The Quest for Certainty*, Dewey makes the search for certitude the root of all philosophic evil, a search which eventually leads to the deprecation of directed practical action. One might well ask the question: on what basis is the search for security devoid of courage and the demand for action bereft of timidity? Is the quest for final and compelling goodness, truth, and beauty an act of timidity and a facile search for protection? Dewey laments the existence of eternal values in an unstable world as having no relevance for the existential situation. On the contrary, has not the vision of an ideal truth spurred men on to translate their vision into effective terms for life?

The quest for certainty is unworthy from Dewey's point of view because it diverts attention and effort from the practical things which need to be done. On the other hand, the search for the absolute or the perennial is man's search for that to which he can give uncompromising devotion and loyalty, what he traditionally calls the good, the true, the beautiful. In his search for an absolute, man lets the consequences of his quest be what they may. One can hardly call this an escape from reality or a search for the easy and the protective. In reality, it is a courageous unwillingness to accept the tragic present as final and unmalleable. Perhaps in this regard Santayana's accusation of Dewey as having near-sighted sincerity is a valid one. Surely one may usefully question the adequacy of Dewey's instrumentalist position as a philosophy of life in times of deep social conflict.

Do we really violate the method of tested intelligence and philosophic inquiry when we affirm that there are kinds of truth to which these techniques are inapplicable? In a perceptive passage in his *Five Stages of Greek Religion*, Gilbert Murray notes that:

> "The Uncharted surrounds us on every side and we must needs have some relation towards it, a relation which will depend on the general discipline of a man's mind and the bias of his whole character. As far as knowledge and conscious reason will go, we should follow resolutely their austere guidance. When they cease, as cease they must, we must use as best we can those fainter powers of apprehension and surmise and sensitiveness by which, after all, most high truth has been reached as well as most high art and poetry: careful always really to seek for truth and not for our own emotional satisfaction, careful not to neglect the real needs of men and women through basing our life on dreams; and remembering above all to walk gently in a world where the lights are dim and the very stars wander."

To inquire about spiritual values and their effect upon human behavior, to pursue the contemplative approach to perennial ideals is for Dewey a meaningless endeavor. To be fruitful, philosophy must concern itself with the experimental and the tentative, it must search for practical outcomes, it must get results. Yet Dewey's intrepid and tireless espousal of "lost" causes, his persistent and unyielding fight for the extension of human decency, his extensive writing in defense of freedom of knowledge, his refusal to retreat into the purely technical and trivial philosophic questions—all betray him. Indeed, Dewey's devotion to the method of tested intelligence is itself commitment to a fixed rule and therefore an end. Education for Dewey is the reconstruction of experience; not the rebuilding of experience in terms of brutal, inhuman goals, but rather in terms of the social good, that is to say in accordance with the aims of an ideal society. The quest for the ideal society, the search for the social good must needs go beyond the empirical

fact. This is what Dewey does his best to prevent. Yet both Dewey and his disciples unwittingly follow instrumentalism, with a passionate loyalty and devotion to fixed ends ever hovering in the background of their thought.

Dewey's goal for education, a goal to which we can give full measure of allegiance, and which was implicit both in his personal life as well as in his writings is simply stated: use your mind, use it boldly and freely. The ideal end to which Dewey would direct the educative arts is summed up by Paul Tillich when he tells us that ". . . in the depth of every serious doubt and every despair of truth, the passion for truth is still at work. Don't give in too quickly to those who want to alleviate your anxiety about truth. Don't be seduced into a truth which is not really your truth, even if the seducer is your church, or your party or your parental tradition."

FIRST PRINCIPLES FOR A MODERN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

(*Continued from page 11*)

It seems so much wiser to teach and demonstrate that the good is that which promotes individual well-being. . . . The man who practices the good is the one who releases the potentials of his interests—of self-realization.

Fundamentally, this apparent cleavage between the good and the desired is a matter of teaching emphasis, the roots of which go back into traditional theological assumptions—stemming from the old dualism between "flesh and spirit" or "appearance and reality." We are asking for a shift of teaching emphasis: to the point of view that the good has adaptive, survival value content; that we should desire the good because it is to our advantage to do so. . . .

This may involve a re-evaluating of some of our inherited moral nostrums, but in our philosophy, since the moral must also be the intelligent, re-evaluating would not be viewed antagonistically.

Given the above approach that the good is an instrument of self-realization, then the task of education becomes two-fold: one, to analyze and evaluate given situations (social, economic, political, etc.) to determine more optimally desirable conditions; and *two*, to provide a methodological attack which will enable the individual and/or group to move from the actual situation to the desired situation.

Finally, we cannot always know what the good is in advance of experience. We can only project such good hypothetically, awaiting the final test of experienced consequences.

In summary, such an educational approach to values will merge and identify the good with self-interest; it will encourage individual participation in the good: it will encourage critical scrutiny of existing goods and hence make morality intelligent; it will encourage the constant growth of ideals; and finally, it will make necessary the provision of method through which ideals may become actualized.

FOURIER AS PHILOSOPHER

BY ELMO A. ROBINSON

PRIOR TO 1840 the name of Charles August Marie Fourier (1772–1837) was little known in the United States. During the next few years, thanks to Greeley, Brisbane, Ripley, and others, his doctrines were widely discussed, and in his name forty-eight communitarian societies were organized, including twenty-eight established colonies.[1] Thereafter Fourier was soon rapidly forgotten. Today the number of persons who have read him, even in translation, is negligible. He is mentioned with respect in some histories of economics[2] and, although others claim him as an anarchist, of socialism.[3] He is largely ignored by philosophers, and inexcusably so by psychologists and educationists.[4] As a philosopher he does not rate highly, for he was an isolated thinker, little influenced by, and little influencing the main stream of philosophical ideas. He was relatively uninterested in what others had thought. So far as he read political philosophy, he read superficially.[5] Yet in spite of his ignorance, lack of system, and fantastic speculations, he merits more than our complete inattention.

In this brief paper I shall minimize Fourier's economics and concentrate on less-known phases of his thought. My chief source of information is a translation of Fourier by Albert Brisbane, published in 1876 under the English title "Theory of Social Organization."[6]

SOCIAL CRITICISM

Fourier regards civilization as a disease of racial infancy from which we are about to escape. Specifically he indicts agriculture for its poor crops, eroded land, and lack of forestry; commerce for its frauds, monopolies, and inefficiency; and the family, because its loyalties are placed before the common good. The root of these ills is abundance of unproductive classes. These include the idle rich and their servants; army and navy; lawyers; tax collectors; nine-tenths of the merchants; politicians; prisoners; two-thirds of the women and children; and, as in London, swarms of beggars, vagabonds, and thieves. Fourier "is maddened

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[1]Arthur E. Bestor, Jr. *Backwoods Utopias* (1950).

[2]Charles Gide and Charles Rist, *A History of Economic Doctrines* (1948).

[3]E. S. Mason, "Fourier and Anarchism," *Q. Journ. Econ.*, 42 (Feb. 1928) 228–262; Alexander Gray, *The Socialist Tradition* (1946); J. O. Hertzler, *A History of Utopian Thought* (1923).

[4]Fourier is not listed in the International Index through June 1953, in the Readers Guide through July, 1953, nor in the Educational Index through May, 1953.

[5]Mason, *op. cit.*, 243.

[6]Published by C. P. Somerly, New York. The title is not included in the Library of Congress list, although another book by Brisbane, published by Somerly in 1876, is included. Nor does the title correspond to any of the French titles of Fourier's works.

by the sight of 300 women, in 300 little houses, lighting 300 little fires, and cooking 300 little dinners in 300 little pots for 300 little men"[7] when three or four women with a small number of pots and fires would do it better.

EPISTEMOLOGY

Fourier is an irrationalist, attacking reason with all the reason at his command. He holds reason to be incompetent to devise an acceptable plan for human society. It is vain to pursue happiness through constitutions and legislation. Rather must reason become the servant of the passions. It is the passions which determine what society ought to be; reason is of use only in leading us to the means for their gratification. Similarly, reason is incompetent to discover the divine plan. Only human passions can reveal God's way and purpose.

Yet his irrationalism has limits. For mathematics and physical science he has praise; they have supplied us with knowledge of the basic laws of the universe. In the so-called sciences of politics, economics, ethics, and metaphysics, however, he has no confidence.

METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY

Like most anti-metaphysics Fourierism rests on an assumed metaphysics. Newton, he tells us, discovered the laws of attraction and harmony of the planets. Fourier claims for himself equal honor for extending these concepts of attraction and harmony to the entire universe, including human behavior. Through science we also know that nature is a unity and that there are natural classes of things. Applying these principles to ideal society, Fourier asserts that there are seven natural social functions: Domestic industry, agriculture, manufacture, commerce, education, science, fine arts. These should be so organized that natural forces of attraction will produce social unity and harmony. A man's life should harmonize internally and also externally with mankind, nature, and God.

Such human goals rest upon the very attributes of God himself. These are economy of means, distributive justice, universality of Providence, and unity of system. God has created man with passions which exemplify the universal law of attraction. By allurements of love and pleasure God obtains that which man knows how to obtain only by coercion and violence. The passional code is universal; everywhere the race has the same passions. (In other words, Fourier reverses the position of Kant: Reason is variable and deceptive; attraction stimulates men to universal responses.) We ought not to believe in God only half way, but have faith in the universality of Providence. God is good. All that he has created is good. Therefore man's passions are good. With them God has pre-calculated a plan for man's happiness in industrial and social relationships.

There should be less talk about man's duty to God and more about God's duty to man. It is God's duty to give man happiness in this life. If God has failed to provide for this, Fourier is ready for him with a bill of sixteen charges and a psychoanalysis of God's conflicts. But no! Man is created with the longing for harmony and endowed with organizable instincts. Under present civilization

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[7]Gray *op. cit.*, 178.

these give results opposed to God's purpose; under association, in accord with it. Universal unity on earth is the collective destiny of man. As for immortality, that is for faith, not demonstration. But man's task as overseer of the earth demands of him qualities which imply that he is immortal.

Brisbane sums up the position thus: Fourier believes that "the human race, composed of the totality of human beings that live through the ages, is One; that it lives, grows, and acquires experience like the individual man; that, like him, it goes through a career; that it has its social infancy, youth, manhood, and old age, and that it has a great work to accomplish on earth by its collective labors."

SOCIAL ETHICS

This abstract goal of unity and harmony is amplified by a list of the general goals for man: food, housing, health, and longevity. With respect to food, for example, the variety of flavors of vegetables should be increased, sugar and fruit made more available (lemonade is especially praised), and four or five meals served each day. As to housing, "instead of the chaos of little houses. . . . . which vie with each other in inconvenience, ugliness, and filth," there should be vast and elegant edifices, well ventilated and proofed against fire, vermin, and insects. These should provide apartments at varied rentals, spacious halls warmed by steam three hours out of the twenty-four, and heated connecting passageways to workshops and stables. As to health and longevity, infant mortality should be reduced, children's teeth examined weekly, infectious and many other diseases eliminated, and the race strengthened by diet, activity, and pleasure. Man is the standard by which nature is to be judged. What is injurious to man must be destroyed.

Pursuit of these goals will lead to increased production through construction of mountain reservoirs, canals, and irrigation; to the conservation of forests, fish, and game; to a reclamation of desert lands. These changes in turn will improve weather and climate and extend cultivation ultimately to the entire surface of the earth. The task of science is to achieve these goals.

All this may be accomplished without depriving men of their seven natural rights: gathering natural products, pasturage, fishing, hunting, interior federation, external marauding, freedom from care, together with the hyper-cardinal right to labor. Society ought to guarantee to every man the necessary conditions for enjoyment of these rights *or their equivalent.* A basic condition for this is a system of industry in which all necessary labor is attractive. A minimum for the poorer members of the community includes board, clothing, a private apartment for each person, and free admission to public halls, assemblages, and operas.

PSYCHOLOGY

The key to Fourier's psychology is *passion*, a word which is defined for him by Gray as "ways in which pleasure may be experienced or heightened." [8] There

[8] Gray, op. cit., 181.

are four main types: (1) Unrecognized and hence unnamed passions. (2) Passive passions; these are the five senses. (3) Active passions; these are the affections or appetites of the soul, including friendship, love, ambition, and parentalism. (4) Neutral or distributive passions; these are subdivided into three kinds: (a) The alternating or butterfly passions; this is desire for periodical variety, for contrast and novelty, felt strongly after two hours of effort or less. If thwarted, one becomes bored or apathetic. This is bad, for, as one commentator puts it, "God did not make man for monotony." (b) The emulative or cabalistic passion; this is desire to excell, expressing itself in factional rivalries, diplomacy, intrigue, and in love of management. "If a company is assembled," writes Fourier, "means must be provided for satisfying this passion—by putting cards into their hands or by some other device." The restlessness of the retired merchant illustrates the thwarting of this passion. (c) The composite passion; this expresses itself in integrated interplay of several passions.

Whatever his topic, Fourier is inclined to present similar classificatory tables, apparently without intending that they be taken as more than tentative, partial analyses. So with this analysis of the passions. For elsewhere we read that the primary want is wealth, by which he means certitude of employment and a decent minimum for comfortable subsistence. With reference to ambition he finds two springs of action, or motives: interest and glory. The glory motive he would have society discard, along with the love of gain, fear of want, duty, and constraint. The interest motive, a synonym for attraction, he would retain.

Of attraction there are three kinds, two good and one bad. The bad is inverse attraction: the just mentioned love of personal gain. Of the good types, direct attraction springs from objects on which activity is exercised. The lives of Linneaus, Lavoisier, and Hobbes he asserts to have been thus motivated. Indirect attraction springs from external incentives, as in the case of the naturalist who keeps reptiles. Activity of this sort is motivated by noble incentives, philanthropy, *esprit de corps*, collective friendship, and religion.

By such analyses Fourier stresses the identity of passional structure in all men and sameness of response to any given social situation. Somewhat inconsistently he emphasizes equally the fact of individual differences, the wide variety of characters, tastes, and fortunes expressed by varying consumer demands. In fact there are 810 distinct types of character. No individual can be a complete person, exhibiting all possible traits. No husband-wife combination is a complete person. Completeness of person can be found only in a community which includes at least one representative of each of the 810 types. God framed human passions for communal life, not for isolated families. A properly constituted communal life will facilitate working together for the common good. To serve such a community is to serve God.

INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Since God distributed the passions as attractional forces, their proper application to industry will render work more seductive than balls, festivals, and theaters. The fact of individual differences points to a regime of contrasted and graduated inequalities. Men desire not equality, but rather proportional wealth, individual happiness, unity of action, and the reign of justice. Nearly all industrial and

agricultural enterprises should be so organized as to directly appeal in themselves. The remaining disagreeable tasks should be indirectly attractive through noble incentives and affectional passions. To satisfy the butterfly passion, both tasks and groups of companions are to be changed about eight times a day in a system resembling that of our college classes. Individual preferences for associates and for tasks are to be considered. To satisfy the emulative passion, there should be rivalry between groups. Making work pleasant in these and other ways will increase health, vigor, and skill. Making work lovable will develop a co-operation of men who sing as they work.[9]

EDUCATIONAL THEORY

Fourier's philosophy of education is as significant as his theories of economic and industrial life. Without any pretense of a thorough study of children, Fourier did observe their behavior. Education he defines as "the art of fascinating and subduing the child by attractive authority."[10] The aim is stated variously: unity; material wealth by means of dexterity and health; preparation of the body for the soul; development of all parts of the body and all faculties of the soul; the creation for children of an industrial charm sufficient to subdue and fascinate them. Ultimately, education is to be global: one education, one system for all. But this is not advocacy of uniformity nor equality of fortunes and character; rather is it a plea for homogeneous habits and manners.

Children should have perfect freedom in everything not injurious to them. Use of constraint is a mark of failure. Only dangerous liberties, those which will prevent subsequent choices, are to be restrained. As soon as a child can walk he is to have liberty to run about the workshops under guidance; after the age of two and a half, this guidance is to cease. He is then to have full liberty of choice of occupation and of its duration.

Traditional aims and means are discarded. Children are not to be taught conventional virtues, nor obedience to the call of duty, nor respect for superiors. Instead, the influence of parents must be neutralized, for it is bad. Parents flatter their children, defer to them, impose tasks upon them. Thus, love and family affection are not proper influences for the young. The influence ought to be in the other direction. If we can organize the group life of children harmoniously, adults will be moved to imitate them.

To replace the discarded means, we are to use the child's senses, his corporate ambition, and other passions. Consider the aspiring impulse. It is natural for a child to emulate an older child, to accept his rebuffs and his ridicule. If the child is subjected to such influences during the day, parents cannot do him much harm in the evening. Judged by his equals, rather than by his parents, he will respond co-operatively in the learning process.

There are other passions to be employed in education: pleasure of short sessions and of rivalry; the collective impulse expressing itself in group tasks, songs, dances, and ceremonies. By proper planning, curiosity may be awakened, as

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[9]Gray, *op. cit.*, 172, 185.

[10]Fourier (Brisbane's translation), part II, p. 145.

for example, in inducing reading by showing attractive books and pictures. In education as in industry, the rule is always to utilize the passions. In earlier years, this involves accepting and making use of fickleness, fondness for the society of older children, and the inclination to disobey parent and teacher.

Children are to be rated as to skill in each of their activities on a three-point scale: novice, graduate, and licentiate. The same child may be a novice in making matches, a graduate in pea-shelling, and a licentiate in puppet shows. By age, children are to be classified as nurslings, weanlings, infantiles, cherubs, seraphs, lyceans, gymnasians, and juveniles. Promotion is to be made at the request of the child and on the basis of skill in a battery of practical performance tests given by the group to which he seeks admission. These tests will make native individual differences explicit. If a child is retarded six months or more, he is to be assigned as an irregular to an accessory choir.

Child and youth have a natural interest in wealth prior to a concern for knowledge. Each must be led by natural interests, operating with material goods, to ask for instruction. If a group loses a flower contest, the teacher will tell about soils. Pupils will ask for books on mineralogy and seek to find out more about the effects of manure and temperature.

All this Fourier calls progressive education or the progressive method, and he knows what he means by these terms. The pupil is to progress in each skill which he learns. He progresses from simple to more difficult tasks. He progresses from tasks directly attractive to those which are only indirectly attractive. By the age of nine, he is ready for the cultivation of his moral nature, for friendships, honor, and patriotism, and for intellectual life and the world of science. But moral development is prior to scientific. For of what use is scientific education before formation of attitudes which promote the general happiness? The two devices proposed for moral education are the Junior League and the Junior Band. These are contrasted avenues to goodness and beauty. Each boy and girl may choose between them.

The Junior League rests on the childish passion for wading in the mire, for playing in the dirt, for uncleanliness. It aims to give them all they want of this and to make dirty work attractive. They are to be drawn into unclean, repulsive, or even dangerous tasks: cleaning the stables or sewers, killing snakes, eliminating the sound of croaking frogs, preparing small animals for cooking, assisting in the care of the sick, repairing and ornamenting the highways. These unattractive tasks must be made indirectly attractive by various devices; periods of work must be brief and must be accompanied by ceremonial parades with triumphal crowns and banners. The sense of honor and the love of daring must be appealed to. Thus, youths and maidens will learn to undertake such functions with cheerfulness and perceive the vast field for unitary philosophy and industrial glory.

The Junior Band, on the other hand, is for the precocious geniuses who incline to elegance and refinement of manners, who desire to excell in the arts and sciences. Its members will take charge of flowers and lawns, of altars and ceremonies. They will cultivate correctness of language to the point of becoming critics of the speech of other children and of adults.

Throughout the entire educational scale, there is to be a close interrelation between school and community life in gardens, orchards, stables, poultry yards, kitchens, and workshops. For example, children are to be given the task of educating domestic animals. Even at the age of three or four they are to be attracted to many branches of industry. In each child, there is a natural aptitude for skill and enjoyment in about 30 vocations; these he must be guided to discover for himself. Training for dexterity and industrial precocity is fundamental. Two-thirds of nature's useful plants are the right size for child cultivation. The care of flowers, small fruit, most gardens and lawns can be left to women and children. Similarly, there should be available attractive little workshops equipped with proper tools. The privilege of using these is to be gained only by examination and promotion. Or consider eating, at which children are gluttons. They need to learn refinement of taste. Who are the best judges of food? Cooks. A cook is a social dignitary of the highest grade, a master of science. Therefore, make children cooks and canners. The kitchen is the first natural school of the child.

But the most efficient means to "unitary education of association" is the opera. Just as the kitchen develops the senses of taste and smell, so the opera develops sight and hearing. Attendance upon it is a semi-religious act, an accessory to worship. Participation gives an exercise in material harmony, which will be recognized as a natural symbol of divine harmony. Moreover, it includes such practical tasks as singing, playing instruments, use of poetry, pantomime, dancing, gymnastic, painting, and costuming. It is a school of ethics, developing a horror of that which conflicts with unity and harmony. One learns that there is no excuse for imperfections. It is a school of criticism, a school of languages, and a normal school for the training of trainers.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FOURIER

Appraisals of Fourierism vary. "One of the distinctly original radical thinkers of the nineteenth century," says Mason.[11] "Just a grown-up boy with the habits of an old woman," who possessed nevertheless the "keenest appreciation of the evils of civilization with an almost uncanny power of divining the future," is the two-edged comment of Gide and Rist.[12] "A pathfinder for modern psychology" who saw that social organization must spring from individual desires is Hertzler's evaluation.[13] And Gray's judgment is: Fourierism is "a unique phenomenon in the world's literature," written "with the calm assurance of a perpetual secretary to Providence, from whom nothing has been concealed" and yet presenting an unsurpassed critique of unrestrained individualism.[14]

Is Fourier to be included among the philosophers? Is a reference to his epistemology and metaphysics presumptuous? Well, is Rousseau to be included? To argue these questions is to argue the definition of philosophy. Fourier, like Rousseau, calls men back to nature, back to the orchards and fields, back to the

[11]Mason, *op. cit.*, 257.

[12]Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*, 245, 255.

[13]Hertzler, *op. cit.*, 197.

[14]Gray, *op. cit.* 171-173

world of the senses and the emotions. The two agree that natural desires are good but have been perverted by bad social organization. But, more clearly than Rousseau, Fourier recognizes the need for careful and detailed planning. He writes in terms of community; Rousseau, in terms of an individual.

Fourier is a psychological hedonist in teaching that men seek their own pleasure, but under civilization few are finding it. He is an ethical hedonist in teaching that community life should be so organized as to promote individual happiness. Basically Fourier, perhaps more than Rousseau, is an individualist. There is no exaltation of the community above the individual. Rather is the community ever to be the instrument for individual welfare.

Fourier is a materialist somewhat in the manner of Santayana. Indifferent to speculations about the nature of matter, he is respectful towards the material basis of life. Diet, housing, clothing, machinery are all important fields of study and application, but only because their proper use will give freer play to the affectional passions and spiritual aspirations of individual men.

Often Fourier seems to have written impulsively. Thus, his inconsistencies are not surprising. All that God has created, including the passions, are good. But does he not say that some passions are not good: sense of duty, love of glory and gain? What he perhaps meant to say is that civilization misuses these passions. In his ideal phalanx, the stock owner would be guaranteed 6 to 8 percent on his investment, and temporary glory for group achievements and victories is legitimate. Duty is reintroduced as the sense of honor.

Other internal contradictions have already been suggested. A philosophy of irrationalism is rationally advocated. But a similar criticism may be directed against others—Schopenhauer and Bergson, for example. Recognition of both radical uniformities and individual differences are essential to Fourierism. Perhaps this corresponds to our current confusions about the possibility of changing human nature and about the subjectivity of values. Then, there is the antithesis between liberty and pleasure on the one hand and classification and bookkeeping on the other—one of the practical difficulties for would-be Fourierist colonies, as also today for American free enterprise.

In some other respects, Fourier is an exceedingly consistent thinker. His principle of attraction and harmony is universal. Descriptively, it explains the solar system, the natural phenomena of this earth, and God's purpose for men. Prescriptively, it points the way to mental hygiene, community and world organization, industrial techniques, educational methods, and religious beliefs and ceremonies. Such singleness of thought is rare. The same law that guides the planets in their courses also will guide the wise planner for industry and the wise builder of curricula.

Fourier has been hailed, sometimes as the father, perhaps often more appropriately as the foreseer, of various developments since his day: socialism, anarchism, the importance of attractive labor conditions, factory laws, sanitation laws, decentralization, rapid transit, conservation, cooperatives, modern hotel life, garden cities, the scouting movement. To these may be added Dewey's theory of interest in education, the project method, college grading systems, the elective system, and four-H clubs. (*Continued on page 33*)

ON PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

BY JOHN WENDON

QUESTIONS ABOUT PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION are embarrassingly unwieldy. In these days of positive actions and ideologies, it may seem unduly hesitant not to have a ready and unambiguous answer, but be that as it may, a philosophy of education cannot be set out like the commandments of Moses. While religions have their creeds, philosophies, their conventional labels and political parties, their platforms, education in a free community is not so conveniently placed. This writer even confesses to uneasiness lest the question itself actually exclude the very subtleties which are for him the sinew of education.

Admittedly, numerous truisms could be marshalled together, and anyone so disposed could hide behind them in all dignity. But at stake is the truth behind the truisms, and considering how much a credo may serve to hide as well as to reveal, it might be well to hesitate before parading a philosophy of education as though at a patriotic rally. Does not the very question about philosophy of education imply something permanently speculative and contingent?

ON THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

It is indeed necessary to be very circumspect as to what is actually meant by *philosophy* of education in the first place. For example, a frequent use of the term refers to educational policies, e.g. "one's philosophy of education is to extend maximum education to a maximum number of the population." It is equally often used to designate a certain group of pedagogical imperatives, e.g., "one's philosophy of education is never to allow indoctrination to pass for teaching." Clearly, both policy statements and ethical maxims are very much part of an educational framework. Education is a social institution and so must be identified by programs; it is also a profession and so must take root in practical precepts and a form of Hippocratic oath. But we may well wonder whether the term *philosophy* of education in regard to these matters is appropriate. The definition of philosophy is the love of that knowledge which deals with ultimate questions of reality or of the principles of things. In respect to education, philosophy—if it means anything—should therefore be concerned with the ultimate principles of education; which may well be a far cry from practical policies and ethical precepts.

A philosophy of education, concerned with the premises of education (that is to say with basic commitments on the nature of man, of history and society, and on the fundamental nature of knowledge), is affected by an altogether different stratum of considerations. It represents an unaccommodating examination of even the idea of education and in effect, of the principles from which are derived the many policies and practicing standards prevalent in education.

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To insist on such a distinction of educational principles and practices is central to the philosophic quest, the more so owing to the tradition, inherited by us from ancient Greece, which has made of education the integrating factor of our diverse affairs. Modern education is to be likened to the trunk of a tree, its roots, sunk into past history, drawing upon the living resources of traditions of experience, and its branches and foliages representing the growth and innovations of the present. Education, in fact, is at the very heart of our social order, at the heart of individual maturation, and at the heart of cultural development. Because it takes account of the processive and creative qualities in human affairs, education has a unique hold on the means to rational growth; but, precisely because so much is at stake in education, it is plausible to expect that a philosophy of education comprises more than the ethics and the politics of education. No less needs to be said in making a statement about it than it takes to give an adequate account of one's Christian convictions, say, or of one's liberal, humanist, Marxist, or pragmatist beliefs.

To this, however, must be added an important qualification. At a pinch, it is always possible to state our religion or our philosophy of life in the language of a credo or text because the decisions have been made and the task is to substantiate life and experience within the given order. Not so in education.

This difference is best stated, for brevity's sake, as a simple assertion. Education is not concerned to make Christians—or humanists, liberals, or rationalists—out of its students, but to make sure that they are Christians, etc., for good reasons. To state an educational philosophy as though it were only a credo, achieves as naive an effect as though one said, by way of religious preference, that he wished to go to heaven.

Education is the domain of choice, and presupposes a perpetual, speculative, experimental, and critical training. Whereas a credo represents a closed system (any choice is selective), education is open in the sense that it makes the credo in question a possible and legitimate choice. By the same token it makes other credos possible. This singular feature has great pertinence for a *philosophy* of education, and it follows that a philosophy of education cannot itself be a credo.

Two Relevant Principles of Education

Education is a form of rhetoric; a mode of persuasion related to the acquisition of knowledge, through heart, head, and imagination. It rests upon an essentially triangular relationship between the student (the processes of learning), the instructor (the processes of teaching), and knowledge. The main responsibility falls upon the instructor, who holds the resources of education in his hands like instruments of power.

The problem of education is, how exactly the instructor may fulfill his responsibility, and the role of a philosophy of education is to study and extract the circumscribing conditions, or principles, by which the triangular relationship is carried forward.

Principles of education can be visualized in different perspectives. They may be taken as norms with ethical inflection, such as "that man is to be considered innately good," and it shall be agreed at once that education can be pro-

foundly affected by a normative maxim of this order. But as a principle, this type of norm belongs to moral philosophy rather than education, and it may be well for realism's sake to view the educational relationship first of all in functional rather than in ethical terms. Moral maxims are interchangeable in accord with the shifts of historical sentiment, and they influence education, as it were, from without. There are, however, principles of education which do not stem from moral, psychological, or historical decisions, and which are intrinsic to it. And it is these which shall be considered in this context.

Could one talk of the natural laws of education, then this would be a good description of the principles in question, taking always into account the important reservation that human affairs are not such as to be unambiguously *natural* at any time or to be reduced to the level of say Galileo's laws of motion. Two interacting educational principles fit the status of natural law. The first is the autonomy of knowledge.

All that education conveys in the form of knowledge and of cultural persuasion has reference to a *state* of knowledge, autarchic in kind and essentially independent of the strictly educational practices which are developed to introduce young students into this state. In other words, the acceptability and legitimacy of knowledge is intrinsic to knowledge and depends on no other sanctions or indorsements. (Thus, if education is a form of rhetoric, the instructor persuades *on behalf of knowledge*.)

It follows that education ought to be conceived as a facilitating institution, as a preparative and as a mediative device acting between the student and the object of his search, knowledge and conviction. In this relationship, which the student seeks to establish, the instructor can ideally intrude only for the general purpose of transference. He should impose nothing on the student (and under the right conditions cannot) nor allow the student to adhere too long or too much to the techniques and rubrics of learning prepared for him.

In this respect, an educator's function is like that of a priest's. His office represents a necessary, but essentially interposed assistance to the student. He too, no less than a student, searches for knowledge and, in the final analysis, can teach only as he has learned. Neither he, as a proponent of a viewpoint, nor education as a whole can become the real object of the student's attention. In that sense, it can be said that the object of education is not learning but knowledge. (One may hold that humanism has been somewhat at fault for having furthered a tendency in education to set up learning as the end in itself.)

Education, thus conceived, is truly liberalizing. Its sole end is to free men for knowledge, i.e. free them from such preconceptions and social or individual encumbrances as might intrude on thought and perception and disperse the flow of men's creative energies from their concentration.

The second educational principle runs as follows: the processes of learning and teaching are accomplished by way of "imitation" in the old Aristotelian sense of participating in the spiritual and intellectual *actions* which went, and always will go, towards the making of the achievements in question. (This applies

equally well where actions are more specifically positive, as for instance in history.) The purpose of such imitation is clearly not to copy, but to understand from within or introspectively the courses of cultural development.

From this principle of imitation much else may be deduced. Firstly, it is the processes of imitation which guarantee intellectual discipline. Secondly, a certain ritual character emerges from these processes, and this ritual element does much to sustain the buoyancy of educational practices weighed down otherwise by the ballast of extraneous scholastic formalities, incompetencies, and the astonishingly widespread difficulties of communication which seem to beset the relationship of instructor and students.

As a ritual, moreover, education is a ritual of initiation. The schoolman initiates students into the circle of standards and practices—in sum, values—which each generation hands on to the next and by acquiring which youth comes of age.

Here, too, however, much depends on what is understood by values. At least one very persistent version of the concept in respect to education ought to be banished.

By some sort of analogical reasoning it has become possible to think of cultural values in the light of commercial experience, and to define as valuable (if it ever comes to definition) whatever is serviceable, useful, fruitful, or practical. The basis is a consumer concept of value, and there can unfortunately be little doubt that education has been much affected by this metaphorical imposition. The pressure comes from the 'consumer', the student, and his parents; the burden being particularly heavy on those who teach subjects like the classics, history, and literature. The result is an ostensible obligation to translate and retranslate traditions of thinking and writing from their original context into a modern, "practical" idiom and to justify them there.

Undeniably, education should have one foot firmly planted in contemporary thinking, but this does not disguise the fact that the above-mentioned expectation of education rapidly *devalues* the material. It turns teaching into a consumer service, with the arbiter of value most often—and by indirection—the very student who is sitting at the fountains of truth because his judgment is still unformed.

Only in the sense of Socrates' "the unexamined life is not worth living", can education be deemed useful. If more of education were built on consumer-values, the integrity and the effectiveness of education—not to mention its meaning—would suffer. The educator would have the impossible task of 'proving' the value of education—and why, indeed, should the Sistine Chapel be useful to a boy in Illinois?—and the student would lose the sense of primary obligation that it is he who must achieve knowledge and not knowledge convince him. Learning, even in a democratic society, is exclusive because it cannot concede anything to ignorance or vulgarity.

There must be no mistaking this. An "education to values", entangled in the demands of a consumer public, defeats itself. For the value of a thing does not lie in whether or not or how we ascribe value to it (consume it), but exists as such or not at all. This brings us back to the first "law", the autonomy of knowledge.

One is reminded of the Englishman Mallory who, when asked why he attempted to climb Everest, replied simply, "because it is there." Such has to be the *mystique* of learning also. Teacher and student—both—learn, and they do so for no other motive than that knowledge "is there". Moreover, the prizes are hardily bought by comparable intellectual skills: endurance, discipline, freedom from vertigo, and an innate temperament (love) suited to the purpose.

The problem for the instructor, accordingly, is not how to convince a student "to go along with" certain, perhaps traditional judgments or e.g., to show him how to appreciate the relevance of the classics for his own life, but to develop in himself the discrimination to recognize beauty, significance, and value when he sees them. Mohammed must indeed come to the mountain.

CONTRIBUTION OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Any philosophy of education, in this consumer age, must consciously set itself against the current and build on the fact that knowledge and creativity *make* the values and, so, represent their own standards. Value in education is not an attribute but a generic force and stems from the autonomous state of knowledge. To it education is what an orchestra is to the original score from the hand of a composer.

Education deals in very hard currency and this should be fully and categorically accepted as part of the nature of education. It is a subordinate discussion what one may do in practice to bridge the perennial gulf between the autarchic nature of creative knowledge and those many students to whom the internal conditions of learning and literature are mysterious and uninviting superfluities.

We may take encouragement from the fact that education is a powerful and effective instrument in the hands of the skillful. Through it passes the harnessed power of an incalculable force—the force of creative values. But precisely because this is so, there is reason to remind ourselves also that a poor education is no less powerful in its bad results than is the rarer, good education in giving men the best use of volition and rational choice.

Is not the position of educators all too much like that of the suitors of Penelope, who find that they cannot win her because they have not the strength to wield that instrument of power, the bow of Odysseus? And unable to prove themselves in the great contest for Penelope's hand by wielding the great bow, they bring disaster on themselves. Only in the hands of the unrecognized Odysseus —its proper owner—does the same great bow become a matchless weapon to gain home and contentment for the eternally restless wanderer.

Power is granted *beneficially* to those alone who are powerful. Whatever else the philosophy of education may do in delivering education from limitations in practice, this represents the heart of its contribution. Its search is for the Odysseus in everyman who aspires to the office of educating others to knowledge.

THE PEIRCEAN SCHOOL

BY GEORGE S. MACCIA

THROUGHOUT HIS PAPERS,[1] Peirce holds a real distinction between theory and practice. Any application of his philosophy to education should be consistent with this dichotomy. Therefore, a clear grasp of what such a dichotomy implies in inquiry and conduct should be obtained. Theoretical inquiry has as its end truth; whereas, practical inquiry has for its purposes the uses of life (I.239). It can be assumed that this distinction between theory and practice would follow throughout education. Thus, there should be at least two different educational curricula, if not in the lower levels certainly at the university level. In support of this inference, let us consider what Peirce says about theory and practice in philosophy.

"I stand before you an Aristotelian and a scientific man, condemning with the whole strength of conviction the Hellenic tendency to mingle philosophy and practice" (I.618). Peirce does not confine the dichotomy to philosophy and practice. He extends it into science. "The true scientific investigator completely loses sight of the utility of what he is about" (I.619). Not only does the scientific man lose sight of any utilitarian ends, but his findings do not directly apply in practical matters. Furthermore the dichotomy between theory and practice must be continued in ethics, for one must not confuse ethical theory with ethical practice (I. 573). Peirce wrote nothing in *Collected Papers* about education for theory and education for practice. However, it seems justified to assume that education for theory and education for practice would be a valid separation in higher education at least.

> I hope to learn whether this university has been set up to the end that such fine young men as can come here may receive a fine education and thus be able to earn handsome incomes, and have a canvas-back and a bottle of Clos-de Vougeot for dinner—whether this is what she is driving at-or whether it is that, . . . she hopes that in this place something may be studied out of which shall be of service in the solutions of . . . problems . . . . In short, I hope to find out whether Harvard is an educational establishment or whether it is an institution for learning what is not yet thoroughly known, whether it is for the benefit of the individual students, or whether it is for the good of the country and for the speedier elevation of man into that rational animal of (which) he is the embryonic form (V.585).

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[1]Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, editors (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931), Vols. I-VI. In keeping with common practice when referring to *Collected Papers*, reference notations are included in the body of the text. The Roman numeral represents the volume. The Arabic numeral represents the paragraph within the respective volume.

It seems clear from the above quotation that, for Peirce, education for theory is of higher value than education for practice. Thus, in extending this notion, the ideal school would be the school in which the pursuit of knowledge was conducted for the sake of knowing, rather than the pursuit of particular ends. Consequently, in applying Peirce's writings, the curricular situation was assumed to be one in which truth, unknown truth, is the final cause.

There need not be complete darkness concerning the general character of the activities which would be pursued in schools. There are in Peirce's writings some scattered hints concerning the nature and content of school activity, or, at least, what school activity should not be. Certainly rote memorization or indoctrination of belief in authority would not be sanctioned by Peirce (V.381). Classroom activities would be conducted in the spirit of inquiry rather than in the spirit of acceptance. In such a class there would be no children sitting with folded hands and with straight backs supporting open-bucket minds into which established, fixed, inert entities are pumped by the teacher. The children would be engaged in activities, both physical and mental, where the learner would discover and obtain a knowledge of living entities (I.44). The prevailing attitude would be an attitude of intense interest which would grow out of a desire to see into the reason of things. *Ratiocination* might be the key term in curriculum. The students would be proceeding by reason from what they know to what they don't know. The term reason must not be construed to mean that the student is not actively engaged in the learning; nor must it be construed that Peirce considered reason ready-made and perfect. As a matter of fact, he thought that strong reasoners were very scarce. However, reasoning can grow and develop. Classroom activities should be designed to pace the abilities of the student, and provide for their growth in the ability to reason. The growth of reason can only come through its use in inquiry for truth. Thus, the unswerving purpose behind all learning is to know truth for truth's sake (I.49). Truth is objective. There are real facts which are governed by real principles. In other words, there is in reality a content whose principles must be known if inquiry is to effectively lead to truth. The pragmatic maxim of meaning is nothing more than a method for ascertaining these principles which are active in the world (V.467).

The only activity implied in the maxim is conceived activity (V.3). For example, in a chemistry class in which the student is attempting to discover and verify for himself chemistry principles, the curriculum would not be so ordered as to leave time for nothing but activity in which the student busily goes through a neat set of experiments illustrating Principle I; then goes through another neat set of applications proving Principle I; a set of experiments illustrating Principle II; then the proving of Principle II; and so on until the workbook is completed. Rather, the teacher would select a few basic principles which form the core of the subject. He would present short, simple expositions which adhere rigidly to the logic of the subject being studied.

> To know what we think, to be masters of our own meaning, will make a solid foundation for great and weighty thought. It is most easily learned by those whose ideas are meagre and restricted; and far happier they then such as wallow helplessly in a rich mud of conceptions. . . . For an individual . . . there can be no question that a few clever ideas are worth more than many confused ones (V.393).

In ascertaining the meaning of the principles, the student must conduct inquiries which penetrate into conceived effects of the principles he discovers. This does not say that the student will not engage in actual manipulation of objects, and in the actual observation of the effects of their reactions. Nor does it mean that the student will not make applications of the principles in appropriate curriculum content. It simply means that there will be time for the student to disengage thought from action, and to think through the principles and their consequences.

In order to determine the organization of curriculum which would be in accordance with Peirce's thought, an effort was made to discover, if possible, some aspect of Peirce's thought which would bring together his diverse statements on learning. What was wanted was a general theory of growth. This principle was found in Peirce's writings on continuity and evolution. According to Peirce, evolution "means nothing but *growth* in the widest sense of that word" (I.174). Growth is a continuous process working toward a definite end. Evolutional development is a growth process which advances from the simple to the complex, the less organized to the more organized, and the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. Now a continuum is general and a general is a Third (VI. 204). Third relates First as first and Second as last. In the cosmos, that which relates first and last is time. Therefore time is Third. Peirce demonstrates that time is continuous and cyclic in character (VI.210). Therefore, Third is continuous and cyclic in character. Thought is a Third (V.208). Thus, thought is continuous and cyclic in character.

In discussing the relationship between mind and matter, Peirce wrote:

> Mind . . . has a continuous extension in space. . . . Now, in obedience to the principle, or maxim, of continuity, that we ought to assume things to be continuous as far as we can, it has been urged (on the other hand) that we ought to suppose a continuity between the characters of mind and matter, so that matter would be nothing but mind that had such indurated habits as to cause it to act with a peculiarly high degree of mechanical regularity, or routine (VI.277).

Thus, matter is "not completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound with habits" (VI.158). This conception of the relation of mind and matter indicates that the evolutionary process is nothing but the growth of thought becoming more diverse which is very characteristic of life. It was concluded that the physiological and intellectual growth of the individual was cyclic. The principle to be applied in the organization of the curriculum is that the child develops cyclicly. While one stage of growth is completing its organization, another is beginning.

In keeping with the principle of growth as proceeding from the less organized to the more organized, the cycles of growth were named: *exploration* (pre-school and primary), *attention* (elementary), *colligation* (junior high school), *generalization* (senior high school), and *ratiocination* (university). These cycles of growth must not be assumed as discrete. They are not sharply separate, for growth is continuous. The transition from one stage of growth to another would be gradual, and each stage would merge one into the other.

Exploration.—Since the child can learn only through experience, it is requisite that he manipulate objects and events. Non-objective art experience with "mobiles", "merging forms", and "live-in structures" might be fitting experience

begun at this level. The non-objective realm of art seems to represent continuity in concrete media better than "realistic" art. Peirce indicates that the continuous character of the cosmos is easily comprehended by a child.

> The child . . . naturally looks upon the world as chiefly governed by thought; for thought and expression are really one. As Wordsworth truly says, the child is quite right is this; he is an
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> eye among the blind,
> On whom those truths do rest
> Which we are toiling all our lives to find.
>
> But as he grows up, he loses this faculty; and all through his childhood he has been stuffed with such a pack of lies, which parents are accustomed to think are the most wholesome food for the child—because they do not think of his future—that he begins real life with the utmost contempt for all the ideas of childhood; and the great truth of the immanent power of thought in the universe is flung away along with the lies (I.349).

Peirce defines intuition as the regarding of the abstract in a concrete form (I.383). Surely, the child learns by intuition. Consider how intently he regards a "mobile", his fascination with sounds, colors, tastes, and odors. The child's investigation and imagination should be allowed free play. Stories and plays, songs and paints would fill the child's life (I.47). The child is filled with spontaneous inquiry. He searches for and finds ideas in the world about him.

In the cycle of exploration there is little system, everything is forcing its attention. Experience is asserting the reality of otherness, and is full of surprises.

Attention:—Recognizable system enters the curriculum at this level. The child would begin to separate and relate the various data of the senses. Conceptions and intuitions gathered by the child would take on organization. He would begin definite habituation of reasoning by induction. The curriculum would include grammar, writing, reading and arithmetic.

Colligation:—The child begins to bring the principles of language together and forms a generalized conception of language as a whole. His mastery of language becomes more precise. Deductive and abductive reasoning would make its systematic beginnings. The curriculum would include classical and foreign languages, mathematics (algebra and geometry), history, biology, and literature (great men, poetry, prose of worth).

Generalization:—The learner begins to discover the most general of principles. The curricular content would be physics, chemistry, advanced algebra, advanced geometry, simplified calculus. Logic would make its entrance into the curriculum. The teacher would emphasize the right way to approach thinking. He would not teach rules of logic, but the need for logical thought. In literature, history and the natural sciences, the student would begin a "great books" program.

Ratiocination:—The curriculum at the university level would be organized much the same as it is at the lower levels of learning. There would be a graduated hierarchy of courses corresponding in character to those at the previous stages of growth. However, the work at the lower levels would not be repeated. There

would be an emphasis on research as research. Throughout all levels, the learning of a few generalized principles which the student would apply would be the aim of the curriculum.

The curriculum for the university would include; advanced and theoretical mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, history, literature, art, music, biography, classical languages, foreign languages, and the comparative sciences. Philosophic studies would include phenomonology.

The author of this paper must make it clear that the curricular organization as outlined was not abstracted specifically from Peirce's writings. The writer applied abductive inferences in the conceived action of a school situation. Such inferences as were made concerning the curriculum in a "Peircean" school are in keeping with the spirit of Peirce's thought and contain, at least, a modicum of truth.

FOURIER AS PHILOSOPHER

(*Continued from page 23*)

The one contribution which Marxism has made to educational theory is polytechnisation—the theory that schools should teach, not specific trades, but familiarity with labor as a whole and the basic forms of production. It is general education to enable the student to understand his world, but in terms of the relations between nature, machines, and labor. Although Marx learned this theory from Owen, it originated with Fourier.

In many respects, Fourier's imagination is not unlike our reality. True, we have no bands of cherubs and seraphs. But we do have Scouts—tenderfoot, second class, first class, eagle; and Camp Fire Girls—woodgatherer, firemaker, torch bearer. One does pass by examination to promotion from one band to the next. These activities are tied into the community life. Moreover, in our schools there is a recognition of retardation and of the need for special methods for the backward. There is that differential grading in specific school subjects which Fourier recommended for the several child vocations. What we have failed too often to do is to give the young an assuring sense of their indispensability in the harmonious functioning of the larger community. For this and much else Fourier would not forgive us.

At first thought the most fantastic of Fourier's theories is that education should center about the opera. But, increasingly, music and drama are serving important functions at all age levels. The teaching of music and speech arts is so being carried on as to resolve psychological conflicts and frictions between groups. The old antagonisms between freshman and sophomore cannot thrive in the atmosphere of the a-cappella choir. The old frictions between town and gown are dissolved in student symphony concerts with citizens as audience. For this and much else, Fourier would praise us.

AN APPROACH TO METAPHYSICAL IDEALISTIC ECLECTICISM

BY F. L. SHOEMAKER

SEVERAL YEARS AGO THE WRITER READ A PAPER titled "Philosophy of Education as a Directive" before The Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society. With some minor revisions it was published in School and Society.[1] The point of view embodied therein is one which has been in process of development for many years and, whenever expressed, has tended to result in certain definite reactions.[2] A considerable number agree in substance. Some tend to classify it as metaphysical idealism. And many are stimulated to ask questions, some of which suggest that an idealist is one who approximates the fossils in his rigidity and antiquity. The present article represents a groping attempt to respond to such questions and reactions and in the process to outline loosely a philosophy, the essential features of which seem to be in basic agreement with the fundamental tenets of idealism.

The expression "groping attempt . . . to outline loosely" is used to indicate that this is not a final statement of, but a quest for and a faith in beliefs which are both tenable and useful in an age which threatens to become increasingly schizophrenic. That is, an age which tends to divide spirit and matter, which is very scientific, democratic, and practical in some areas of thought and action but quite credulous, autocratic, and impractical in others. In the original draft of this manuscript, the words "seem" and "appear" were used often, especially with regard to characteristics of ideas, absolutes, and God. These words appear much less frequently herein. Therefore, the reader is requested to preface most of the descriptions and definitions, especially those pertaining to the Creator, with the phrase "it seems that". It would be an indication of credulity to believe in a God that cannot be described, but it would be effrontery for mortal man to tell God what He is.

One who has aspirations of becoming philosophically minded should have a deep-seated aversion against being classified. Too often, classifications exclude that which he desires to include and includes that which he would exclude. Consequently, the most that should be admitted is a preference for or an inclination towards a given school of thought. If one becomes a member, he may find that he is no longer the master but a servant. *To belong* tends to restrict the right *to be*. Moreover, one should admit to classification only when there is considerable agreement as to the meaning of the terms involved. For instance, as noted,

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[1] *School and Society*, LXXVII, 401–05.
[2] *Ibid.*, LXXVIII, 74–5.

despite the writer's aversion to classifications he finds himself labeled as a metaphysical idealist. Each of these words is subject to many different interpretations, a tendency which is increased greatly when the two are combined. Consequently, the use of this term without definition and elaboration results in as many shades of meaning as there are individuals who make judgments. Therefore, to accept such designation, as well as others of multi-referrents, tends to distort and confuse a position rather than to clarify it, tends to hinder rather than to aid communication. Treatments of Rousseau's philosophy are illustrative. Often he is classified as a rationalist, yet his writings reveal many characteristics which are typical of romanticists. He himself stated that it was as worthy to admire a beautiful sunset as to solve a problem in mathematics. As should be true of all men, Rousseau was too versatile, too universal to be classified into a single category. Moreover, rigid classification and membership tend to be contradictory to the meaning of philosophy itself. Philosophy purports to give a coherent, all-inclusive view of knowledge. Hence it dare be neither partial, nor limited, nor exclusive.

It May Be Eclecticism

Eclecticism may be the only valid philosophical position. As conceived customarily, realism, critical realism, neo realism, scholastic realism, experimentalism, pragmatism, rationalism, romanticism, and idealism include merely certain phases or segments of philosophy. If such were not the case, the term philosophy would suffice. Each school is more or less limited in scope and validity. The thought system of each can be likened to the descriptions of the elephant by the five blind men. Its devotees tend to regard their insights and interpretations as the portrayal of the whole. Seemingly, eclecticism alone is inclusive enough to permit man to use materials and methods with regard solely to their appropriateness rather than their source. Perhaps that is the philosophy which exists in Plato's heaven.

The existence of so many somewhat independent and competing classifications is typical of the difficulties man faces when he endeavors to know reality, to define truth, and to formulate values. As noted, each group attempts to keep its limited version distinct, logical, pure, and undefiled. Consequently, often students are shocked if a teacher, who has been classed as an idealist, grants that values and conclusions should be subjected whenever possible to rigorous tests of experiment and practical application. Their customary response is: "But you are an idealist and the method you suggest is that of pragmatism (or experimentalism)." A suggested reply is: "What difference does that make? An idealist (idea-ist seems to be the preferable term) should be interested primarily in the discovery and application of truth and value. Therefore, he should be willing to use any method which is conducive to that end."

Classification, however, does have certain potential merits. The major of these are the providing of standards by which an individual can appraise his own system of thought, of fostering fellowship among people of similar outlooks, and of facilitating communication within and perhaps between schools of thought. It is possible for men to remain individuals and to make unique contributions and yet belong to given schools of thought provided the limited and qualifying terms

are linked with those of universal scope. Then they should be classified as realistic eclectics, pragmatic eclectics, and so on. Thus, differences would exist within sameness, division within unity. Moreover, a condition would prevail which recognizes differences in taste and judgment, capitalizes on unique insights and interpretations, and, therefore, is in harmony with democratic principles. If terms are defined in such manner, the writer is willing to be classified as a metaphysical, idealistic eclectic.

In the contemporary era, idealism seems to have fallen from grace among a considerable number of American philosophers and particularly those in the field of Education. Science and technology have produced an intellectual climate which finds many of the idealistic assumptions and postulates as defined to be both inadequate and out-moded. The major of these shortcomings are its dualism, its conservatism, its tendency to posit a supernatural God, and its advocacy of absolutes. The conception which to considerable degree seems to be lacking is that there are those who, while they too realize keenly the foregoing shortcomings, continue to regard the chief values and thought tendencies emphasized in idealism as both fundamental and tenable. They regard its inadequacies and restrictions not as essences but as evidences of senesence, a disease which is a constant threat to all living structures. Moreover, such senesence is not pre-ordained. It can be averted, as Socrates so ably attests, by an eternal, skillful, yet humble search for additional and more exact meanings.

AN OLD PHILOSOPHY

Idealism is probably the oldest philosophy. It arose long before the methods of modern science were known and practiced. Hence, intuitive and reflective thinking, largely deductive in nature, were the principal approaches for determining the nature of Reality. As a result, their findings often tended to be visionary, abstract, and impractical. Ultimately, ideas came to be regarded as too holy to be changed, too pure to be defiled by contact with inferior matter. They were conceived as changeless and eternal, matter as changing and decaying. The result of this outlook was dualism, one realm being that of exalted spirit and the other that of inferior matter. With the coming of science, matter became of ever increasing importance to most school men, but not to idealists who continued to be concerned with an ultimate Reality which was rigidly ideational. The results of this separation have been disastrous. Man does need the values sought by idealists but he also needs the methods and results of science if the potentials of life are to be realized most completely.

It has been asked whether idealists have been more fruitful than scientists.[3] It is as impossible to answer this question as it would be to state whether the right eye is more useful in vision than is the left. Both eyes are needed if objects are to be seen as they are; that is, if they are to have a third dimension. In a similar manner, idealism is needed to complement science, science to complement idealism. For instance, the idea of brotherly love has much greater opportunity of becoming a part of daily living if the contributions made by science and technology are accepted and applied. The work of the missionary can be aided greatly

[3] *Loc. cit.*

by unselfish adoption of the Point Four program. However, if a choice between the contributions of idealism and science must be made it seems that the former has been the more fruitful in positing the values which have enabled man to advance in humaneness. It is true that science and technology have made many worthwhile discoveries and inventions but, in turn, they are responsible also for gun powder, the atom and hydrogen bomb, and the bomber plane. Idealism will have to control these latter instruments, will have to establish ideas and means for harnessing the forces which have been discovered and created. Again, while science has made increased production of goods possible, idealism will have to determine whether the potential plenty will be either shared or destroyed. In light of these considerations, it seems that a logical answer to the foregoing question is: "Why choose when you can have both? Why choose between two interdependent goods? Idealism, if properly safeguarded, is unexcelled for the establishing of desirable ends, science for providing means to realize those ends."

The mere fact that idealism customarily has been so divorced from matter and from the methodology of science is no reason for perpetuating the practice. As Jesus said, "Leave the dead to bury their own dead." Philosophers should be as willing to accept the necessary and desirable changes as schools have been. It has not been long since universities were hostile to scientific and technological areas of culture, not long since those areas were regarded as newly arrived, vulgar upstarts. Gradually, however, they were accepted until at present they constitute customarily the dominant position in programs of study. These additions and adaptations represent the response of scholars to cultural changes and developments, represent their attempts to meet the desires and the expressed, if not always the actual, needs of man.

History reveals that institutions which failed to make adequate adjustments waned in popularity and influence. It is likewise with idealism. It appears that its loss of prestige is due to its failure to grow and develop in a world which has become increasingly dynamic and emergent rather than to man's antipathy to ideals. Intuitive and deductive thinking must be evaluated and supplemented by inductive methods if the conclusions reached are to be warranted by facts, are to have a considerable degree of consistency, and are to be of greatest practical value. This is particularly true of ideas claimed to have been received by divine revelation, an approach which is not dealt with in this article because objective evaluation of mystical conceptions is impossible.

The study of ditch water, the careful tabulation of instances, the observance of rat and guinea pig behavior may be tedious and humble, but it is worthwhile. Moreover, the scientific method may lack a long and honorable tradition but, in the brief span of its existence, it has added much to man's store of interesting and useful information, has corrected many existing misconceptions and distortions, has lessened bigotry, and has helped to unify mankind. It seems that the evils which have paralleled such shift of emphasis from an idealistic to a more pragmatic point of view are due primarily not to the falsity of these newer methods of thinking but to their relative over-emphasis, to the tendency of regarding the *new* as the true and the *old* as passé.

Lack of balance between the ideal and the so-called real, between the abiding and the changing, may plunge our portion of the universe into a blazing, thundering

inferno, may bring that untimely end which has been predicted so often by misguided religious zealots. Despite such danger of over-emphasis, these newer methods dare not be ignored if the whole truth is to be known and practiced, if continual progress is to be made toward that kingdom of heaven on earth which many believe to exist in potential. Any idealist who rejects them merely because they were not included in the thought pattern of his "grandfather" or his "patron saint" is unworthy of the noble name he usurps, even though that saint be the immortal Plato. The founders provided germinal concepts. Their descendants can do them no greater honor than to evaluate, cultivate, nourish, and supplement those contributions in such manner that they grow, develop, and change as man's concept of the universe grows, develops, and changes.

IDEALISM REDEFINED

This may seem to suggest that the term idealism needs to be redefined. In fact such action is both proposed and attempted. Words and terms should be redefined as new insights are gained. Their meaning should be determined by the contemporaries who use them rather than by the past. If a new term can be created, it seems equally proper to change the meaning of existing terms provided, both, that there is adequate reason for redefinition, and that such action is taken deliberately and is admitted. Otherwise words become impediments to rather than instruments of thought. Idealism was described in static terms when the universe was regarded as fixed and final. It must be defined dynamically now that the universe is conceived as in process of growth and development.

Such redefinition is practiced in the area of science. For instance, prior to about 1895 the findings of physicists were mechanistic and rigid. Laws were stated with precision concerning specific gravity, falling bodies, momentum, the six simple machines, and so on. Exact prediction was regarded as possible. Then came the discovery of the various types of rays, a finding which has made possible an increased knowledge concerning the structure of the atom. These developments together with parallel movements in other fields of science have produced a veritable revolution. Mechanism is now considered only as an aspect of a dynamic, organismic cosmos. As a result, today no physicist, no ranking scientist believes that exact prediction in the realm of the minute is possible. In fact, such prediction is regarded as impossible. The term physics, however, has not been discarded. Instead its meaning and scope have been changed and enlarged when necessary to embody adequately man's latest discoveries and insights. Revision of inherited beliefs and meanings is no reflection on the founders, but failure to do so would be a reflection on their descendants.

A characteristic of the modern age is to grant that ideas arose out of experience. Moreover, if they are to continue growing, developing, and having meaning, they must be both rooted in and applied to experience. Otherwise as plants pulled from the earth wither and die, so do ideas lose their significance when divorced from actual existence. Both Republicans and Democrats have learned to their sorrow that butter, which has been produced but not eaten, turns rancid, becomes objectionable, and is discarded. Likewise, philosophers should learn that ideas which have lost contact with reality also become unpalatable and meaningless. Ultimately, they too are discarded. In the meantime, minds that feed too exclusively on such abstractions suffer from attrition, become narrow, and bigoted.

This is a danger facing all men who acquire a love for philosophy. That is, words tend to be substituted for ideas. When that occurs, a philosophy loses meaning for all except members of the cult. Even to them, recitals and incantations tend to be mistaken for ideas. Ultimately competing groups appear, each speaking its own special language, each misunderstanding the other, each failing to communicate effectively with non-members. Truth as proclaimed in text and speech is mistaken for the truth as it exists in Reality.

NECESSARILY CONSERVATIVE?

It is accepted commonly that an idealist is a conservative. While such conception may be true to a considerable degree of the camp followers of idealism, it definitely has not been true of its founders. Plato, who probably has been the most influential idealist, broke with the authority of Homer and with many of the mores accepted by his countrymen. Three times he said in the Republic that he saw a wave threatening to engulf him. It seems that the wave referred to was an infuriated public. Certainly, Jesus, the recognized leader of Christianity, was not crucified because of his conservatism. He was worshipped as a docile babe, put to death as a non-conforming adult. Likewise, Jefferson's sayings and writings, especially the Declaration of Independence, were not popular with the Tories who were the conservatives of his age. These men came nearer to expressing dynamic potentials for growth and reform than to prescribing formulas for reaction. Each was schooled in the cultural contributions of the past, as is attested by their references to existing authorities. They are recognized as leaders, however, not because they were cognizant of and referred to previous cultural contributions, but because they went beyond existing ideas and customs, beyond the customary and the accepted. They recognized no man, no book, no institution as infallible authority. In one way or another each stated: "It was said by the men of old, but I say unto you!" The past did provide them with a starting point, a background of materials and values, but it was not a rigid anchor.

The leader lives, works, speaks, and then dies. Soon a new group of disciples arises and says "He said," and that which he said becomes the new authority. Yet those same disciples sing enthusiastically and ferverently: "I would be like him." To be like him, it would be necessary for them also to steep themselves in the wisdom of the ages, to recognize its truths and shortcomings, and then deal as creatively and as dynamically with their age as he did with his. But that requires effort and courage. It is easier to accept and believe. If Jesus were to return, go "to the synagogue as was his custom", and without introduction deliver a message comparable to those given during his ministry, it seems that he would disturb greatly the average church attendant. If it were a trial sermon, it is doubtful that he would be selected. Likewise, Jefferson would hardly be an acceptable and popular speaker at most Jeffersonian dinners.

A similar condition exists in education. There was a great gulf between Froebel, the creator of the kindergarten, and the many teachers who accepted blindly his gifts and occupations. Careful analysis of Herbart's methodology reveals techniques which can be very worthwhile in instruction, yet his contributions became crystallized into The Five Formal steps. The *steps* are invaluable; it is the *formality* which is objectionable.

The followers of idealists, however, are not the only ones to commit this error of worshipping and rote following, as Dewey would attest sadly. The human race has a much stronger tendency toward conservatism than toward liberalism, a condition recognized by Locke. This characteristic is conspicious in *established* religious, philosophical, political, and social systems. It behooves leaders in education, therefore, to recognize this tendency and then adopt procedures to correct it first in themselves, then in their students and the public. Conservatives are needed to provide balance, but a preponderantly conservative civilization is doomed. It, like the tree which ceases to grow, withers and dies. In time, such fate has befallen every great civilization. The body may have remained alive, but the spirit had departed.

Even universities, despite their claim to be centers of research, are not immune to this tendency. In most institutions, degrees, years of schooling, and accumulations of knowledge rather than a roving, dynamic, fearless intellect are primary requisites for placement and advancement. It would be difficult, if they were to return incognito, for a Plato to secure a position to teach The Republic, a Jesus to teach the New Testament. A professor must be a *recognized* scholar, as evidenced by the degrees he holds. Customarily, a Ph.D. is the sine qua non to academic position and promotion. There is some evidence, however, that such condition is lessening, a harbinger of hope for the future.

SPIRITUAL AS PRIMARY

Judging by the questions which are asked of one who is classified as such, it is a common assumption that idealists believe in fixed and unchanging ideas. Those who hold this view do not grasp the chief contribution of idealism, namely that *the spiritual* aspect of the universe is primary. The idealist says, as does the writer of Genesis: "In the beginning God . . . .", "God as creator of the universe", and "Man created in God's likeness". It is this belief, not fixed and unchanging ideas and patterns, which constitutes the essence of idealism. True, often this essence has been described in static terms. However, as said previously, so was the universe described, so were other bodies of knowledge, even the sciences. It is apparent, therefore, that idealism has no monopoly on the practice of becoming "fixed and unchanging". Its essence is the assertion that the universe is basically spiritual.

Prior to the nineteenth century, existing methods, instruments, and content of thinking were inadequate to detect the evolving and emerging nature of things. Since the universe was regarded as fixed and unchanging, it is not surprising that God and ideas were regarded likewise. Such outlook was as natural and logical for them as it is today to emphasize the relative and the changing. Scholars revised their concepts of the universe as they learned more about it. Philosophers should be equally willing to revise their systems so that they too will accord with existing knowledge.

This shift in concept from a universe that was complete and unchanging to one which is in process of growth and development does not necessitate the disavowal of belief in the continuing and the eternal. It does necessitate, however, that these enduring qualities be regarded as dynamic and developmental, as in process of growth and adaptation. Such view is not contrary to knowledge as accepted in other areas. A child changes from day to day and from year to year,

yet he is regarded as the same individual. A youth enrolls in school, undergoes fundamental adaptations, but continues to be recognized as the same person. Change within sameness is accepted as characteristic of normal people. It seems to be equally characteristic of the universe and probably of its creator. That is, it is probable that God is in the same process of growth and development as are His creations. Traditionally, God has been portrayed as the same, yesterday, today, tomorrow, and forevermore, as all-powerful, all-good, and perfect and therefore a finished product, unaffected in nature by His and man's creations. Some men cannot reconcile belief in a God described thus with accepted knowledge concerning the universe. A single illustration must suffice. It is impossible to conceive how an all-good, all powerful and loving God would permit such atrocities as the maiming of little children, women, and old men which occurred at Hiroshima. Modern man can believe in a God of love, however, if He is characterized as emergent, growing, developing, and changing, as one that is limited in power, one that is in *process* of becoming all-good, all-wise, and perfect.

Another belief which fails to accord with contemporary knowledge is the statement that "In the beginning God created." As written, it gives no hint that creation is endless. "Since the beginning God has been in the process of creating" accords better with the thinking of an age which believes in evolution. An emergent universe seems to necessitate an emergent Creator. Otherwise, growth and development would be the product of blind, brute force rather than of conceiving, designing, unifying spirit. It would appear that the role of man in such a scheme of things, man who has been created in His image, is to aid in this on-going process of creation. Once, as superintendent of a local Sunday School, the writer attempted to teach this concept of God-man creativity to pupils of junior high school age. In the process of discussion, the children were asked: "Have you created anything?" A very intelligent boy grinned and said: "Yes! A disturbance." Sometimes it seems that that lad has much company.

In no conceivable way does this concept of God and ideas as "changing yet eternal" lessen the majesty and dignity of either. On the contrary, both seem to gain thereby. An intelligent man would be insulted if he were described as a person who never made any adaptations in his beliefs, attitudes, and conduct. It would imply that he was as inert as the dead matter about him seems to be. On the other hand, he would be insulted also if described as a person who regarded everything as relative, everything as flux. Stable personality and intelligent behavior require both fixity and adaptation, both constancy and change. Therefore, just as it enhances rather than diminishes the stature of a man to say that he possesses these complementary qualities, so does it seem to add to the esteem in which God and ideas are held to grant that they too are in process of growth and therefore of change and development.

Some fear that religion and idealism will be destroyed if described in this manner. It is more probable, as has been true of science, that the effects will be exactly the opposite. Rigid acceptance of and conformity to the past are not conducive to a renaissance. In fact, the practice of describing both God and ideas in fixed terms seems to have caused each to become increasingly alien to an age steeped in the practical outcomes of science and technology, steeped in the intellectual processes of critical evaluation, experimental proof, practical application, and

relativity. Men may snatch a few moments from a busy, hectic life devoted primarily to mundane pursuits and spend them very pleasantly in a house of worship, a classroom, or an armchair. Meditation on ideas can be an interesting, harmless, restful activity, can be a soothing opiate. As potent forces for the establishing of accepted values and for the guidance and control of events, however, it seems that both contemporary religion and idealism have diminished greatly in importance. Their adherents must learn that if the spiritual is to regain its power and influence over men and affairs, its principles must be embodied in a content and expressed in terms which can be understood, accepted, and applied by contemporary man. The fact that men in past ages could believe in fixity is not important. They are dead. That which is important is the things modern men can believe and put into practice. They are the living.

A query which is directed often to one who regards the universe as essentially spiritual is: "Do you believe in a super-natural God?" A God described in the foregoing paragraphs appears to be as natural to the world we live in as is the life, form, and beauty of that world, as natural as is the inventive and creative mind or spirit of man. It is granted that a factory or store was designed and constructed by men with minds. The question is never asked whether the minds which produced such creations are supernatural. Yet a Creator of the universe seems as natural and as requisite as is a creator of art, music, bridges, and houses. It is not suggested that all men will accept the existence of a God. If He is accepted, however, He need not be regarded as super but as natural; He need not be something apart from the visible tangible world but the living, creating, designing, willing phase of it. "In Him we live and move and are." In these words the ancients seem to have expressed a fundamental, tenable truth, a truth which appears to be somewhat similar to modern transcendentalism.

Another query often directed at idealists pertains to the reality of matter, namely: "Is matter real? If so, is it on a lower plane than that of the spiritual?" It seems as fruitless to debate this issue as to argue the relative importance of the various factors of a given number. Just as all factors are necessary to produce that number, so both spirit and matter seem necessary to produce mundane existance. For instance, the lover of flowers does not attempt to decide whether the beauty or the matter of bloom is most essential. True, undoubtedly he is most interested in and most concerned with the beauty aspect, but experience has taught him that form and color do not exist apart from substance. If the flower is crushed, its beauty is lost. In a different form, however, its matter does remain. A similar situation seems characteristic of man. For perhaps three score years and ten, spirit and body are an organic whole. Once they are separated, it is somewhat shocking to touch the body of "the departed". Perhaps it would be more shocking still to meet the disembodied spirit. Therefore, idealists, as the botanist, must accept both spirit and matter if they hope to present a philosophy which is both intelligible and significant to contemporary man. Despite assertions to the contrary by some idealists of the past, it seems that the spiritual is merely the prime mover of the cosmos, is the apex of a hierarchy of properties, not the cosmos itself.

A MEANING OF ABSOLUTES

Absolute is another term which causes much confusion and disagreement. It also has tended to mean fixed, final, and independent. Absolutes were so defined at a time when the universe was regarded as mechanistic and static. In an organismic universe, concepts of absolutes, as of idealism and God, must be revised if they are to be comprehensible, meaningful, and compatible with other phases of knowledge and existence. As has been said before, change, flux, adaptation, and relativity are as characteristic of the universe contemporary man conceives as are permanence, sameness, the constant, the enduring, and the eternal. Each set of attributes is necessary in a philosophy which is adequate. Over-emphasis on the fleeting may have caused much of the contemporary confusion, insecurity, and laxity. A stable, enduring, democratic society cannot be established on such shifting sands. A civilization, as a building, must rest on rock-like foundations which are firm and enduring.

The term absolute seems more adequate than any other to describe these enduring, stable realities. Almost everyone grants that there are many things to which man must comply. The principle of gravity is illustrative. Gravity existed in the nature of things from the beginning. Man had to deal properly with it or suffer the consequences. Galileo neither created nor established that law. He merely discovered and stated its nature. Prior to his time, an unrestricted fall from a tall tree was just as disastrous as it would be today for a professor of science—or for an experimentalist. Likewise, every architect must deal with gravity as a fixed element in his calculations. The letter "a" is used because there are other fixed elements which must be incorporated such as beauty, nature and cost of materials to be used, and desires of the owner. Each must be considered in and of itself and in relation to the others. Numerous adjustments and compromises must be made. Therefore, there is much relativity with regard to both choice and outcome. However, there is fixity also. Once an element is included, the outcome is affected. Some of the atrocities called houses are caused by an over-emphasis on one or more of the conditioning factors, to the partial neglect of the others. The adage, "For whatsoever a man sows, that will he also reap", teaches this same principle. His sowing is relative, is the result of personal choice. Once made, however, to a degree the quality of the expected harvest has been determined. If corn is planted and cultivated properly, the only possible crop will be corn. There is a direct relation between cause and effect.

Scientists, as idealists, believe that there are better and perhaps best principles. It is granted that scientists may work co-operatively "on the basis of tentatively accepted working hypotheses." [4] Such hypotheses, however, are the closest possible approximation to a *truth* which they *believe* does exist. Moreover, they search almost feverishly for truth because they are convinced that the universe is orderly, is based on truths and relationships. The great body of tested theories and laws already discovered suggests that "there is gold in the stream bed" and therefore serves as a stimulant to further researches. That is, the work of scientists indicates that they do accept the existence of truths independently of man's discovery of them, and, therefore, that they believe there is both a realm

[4] *Loc. cit.*

of known knowledge and a realm-of-the-to-be-known. Judging by their behavior, their goal is to make *the known* the closest possible approximation of *the knowable.* Idealists are convinced also that there are certain truths in the universe and that man must bring himself into harmonious relations with those laws if he is to live the good life. A major concern of the idealist is man's relations to himself and to others. That is, he is concerned about morality. Moreover, he too believes, as do scientists, that truth exists on two levels, namely that which is to be found in the ultimate nature of things or Reality, and that which has been declared by man. The former are the commandments established by God, the latter the commandments discovered and stated by man.

THE HIGHEST GOOD

The absolutes in which idealists believe exist in the realm of The Ultimate Reality, of the-to-be-known. Man, through experience and experiment, has discovered segments of these truths, has attained a partial view of them. These absolutes, as God, ideas, and the universe are not inert, static and fixed entities but dynamic, growing, and developing realities. Moreover, they may be regarded as tendential, as directional in nature. For instance, respect for human personality is a constant, yet the form in which it is manifested depends upon other qualifying factors which are also of an absolute nature. Knowledge of absolutes can be approximated, but probably never realized in full. As the apostle Paul said, "For now we see as in a mirror dimly, but then face to face," a statement which may have been influenced by Plato's allegory of the cave with which Paul was probably familiar. The nearer man approaches this knowable and then incorporates his findings into customs, morals, institutions, and laws, the more richly, fully, securely, and serenely will he live.

There seems to be great value and slight danger in believing that absolutes exist in the realm of the knowable. Such belief makes man humble. It stimulates a desire to search for truth. And these constants provide direction and discipline to life to the extent that they are known and practiced. The danger comes when it is decreed by custom, commandment, person, or institution that the truth has been discovered, that it is known. Compliance with absolutes thus decreed tends to result in totalitarianism and in dictatorship, to be restrictive and debilitating to man both individually and collectively. On the other hand, an institution or group which asserts that *its* version is *the truth* becomes dominating, egotistical, narrow, and authoritarian. Likewise, an individual tends to develop comparable characteristics to the degree he claims that his beliefs are ultimate. The one dogmatism which seems permissible, even necessary, is that the search for Reality dare not be restricted by either man or institution.

Man tends to accept that which exists in his culture group as the truth. It is difficult to conceive that there is a realm of moral truth which transcends the morals culture has proclaimed as true. As a result, there are great variations in existing moral codes, a condition which has led to the belief that morals are relative, that they are what man makes them. It would be equally consistent to say that gravity is what man makes it simply because there are differences in its formulation. The latter is not said because, since result follows action so directly, man has learned that gravity is a potential power with which he must either comply or suffer the consequences. In morals, however, often a long period of time elapses between violation and consequences.

If this line of reasoning is valid, then the good exists on two levels, namely the Highest Good and man's concepts of the good. This condition applies to all ideas and not merely to that of morals. Man is not God, hence his conceptions are limited and somewhat erroneous. Consequently, they should be subject to continuous evaluation and criticism, resulting in redefinitions, amendments, and innovations. If the changes made are to be beneficial, however, the new must be as much or more in accord with The Highest Good as was that which preceded it. Progress of civilization means, therefore, that man has come closer to The Ultimate Good, The True, and The Beautiful; to be farther away would be to retrogress.

Ideas, the highest good, absolutes, and God have been portrayed as eternal but changing, growing, and developing. Emergence seems to be a dominant characteristic of all phases of existence. The Ultimate is ever advancing. Man's quest for True Being, therefore, is somewhat like seeking for the end of the rainbow. A difference, however, is that, as he seeks to know, knowledge is discovered which if practiced both adds greatly to the scope and quality of living and promotes the emergence of The Ultimate. When this highest level exists, God and man have become partners. Together they are advancing toward the ever enriching concepts and practices of a more utopian existence.

Idealism, if adjusted to accord with the best man knows, appears credible. Moreover, it posits certain beliefs which enhance the dignity and meaning of existence. The major of these beliefs are: First, The Prime Mover of the Universe is spiritual. Second, matter is real also and, within our present frame of comprehension, is a necessity for existence. Third, the spiritual is embodied in and is integral with the nature of things. Fourth, the most complete and highest observable level of the spiritual is found in man. Fifth, man is endowed with a mind which is capable of discovering progressively the nature of things and within limits of adjusting his behavior to accord with his findings. Sixth, life must be lived in accordance with numerous complementary absolutes, a condition which provides the direction and discipline needed for the development of stable personality. Flexibility exists also in that man must appraise multiple possibilities, in that he has freedom of choice. And seventh, man's stature is enhanced tremendously by realization that he need not be a puppet on the stage of life but can and should be an essential factor in determining the nature of the on-going eternal scheme of things and of himself.

Before enumerating the educational implications of the idealistic metaphysical phase of this philosophy, it seems necessary to consider the qualifying and limiting effects of eclecticism. A major effect is that the twin principles, "not too much and not too little" and "both and" must be observed in determining curriculum, methods, and procedures. Discipline and freedom, science and the classics, vocational and general education, the informational and the aesthetic—each is an essential aspect of an integrated whole. Likewise mind and body, the rational and the emotional, the spiritual and the material seem to be present in the universe as it exists. Overemphasis on any one subject or phase ignores the many-sided interests, needs, and potentialities of both individual and collective man.

It seems futile, also, to engage in theoretical wrangles concerning the special importance of certain subject matter areas. Such importance seems relative to

time and place, to society and individuals. Moreover, values without instruments are useless, while instruments without values can be dangerous. Proponents of a given school of thought or culture area must remember that they are not engaged in a "most perfect baby" contest. Rather they are custodians of a culture and a process. Very humbly and skillfully, somewhat as the members of an orchestra, they should make their unique contributions. Moreover, they must make them without benefit of a single director. Therefore, unity and harmony can be attained only if the various participants are searching earnestly for the best possible program, are eager to hear and entertain opposing views, and have numerous mutual values, interests, understandings, and proficiencies.

Problem solving as emphasized by the experimentalist is esssential. So are experiences with the great books, religious and secular, with art masterpieces, classics in music, sports, trades, natural and social sciences, and mathematics. Since each is an integral element of the universe in which man lives, each must be an integral element of an educational program which purports to be most effective. Within such conditions, it seems that metaphysical idealism can contribute certain significant views and emphases to the theory and practice of education. Each principle, however, should be regarded as complementary to the others and therefore as only one of several "tendential absolutes". First, that the child, as are all individuals, is of supreme worth. He "has been created in the image of God". Second, that the child represents undirected potentiality and, therefore, his nurture must be stimulated and directed by formal instruction, discipline, and guidance as well as by accelerating opportunities for informal, free, and creative activities. Third, that while it is essential to emphasize freedom, activity, and creativity, the role of subject matter dare be neither depreciated nor minimized because it is basic and therefore indispensable in the learning process. Fourth, that to the greatest degree possible, until late in the schooling process, the scope of subject matter should be as representative as are life needs, activities, and interests. Fifth, that, customarily, interests should be cultivated and then followed rather than the converse. Sixth, that within degree students must learn to adjust to that which is. As is true of science, laws and customs which are the result of the democratic process need to be observed in the main both because they represent the expressed insight and choice of their society and because community living would be impossible if each individual acted as he pleased. And seventh, youths should be taught the concept that existing beliefs, knowledge, values, and institutions must be subjected continuously to critical examination and, when necessary, to additions, corrections, and amendments. Only to the extent that these practices are followed and that the act of making compromises is acquired and practiced can man be regarded as truly democratic and be worthy of the right to speak as "one having authority." Otherwise, society tends to be torn asunder.

If man is to attain maximum growth and development, he should realize that The True is The Sacred. The existing and the declared merely represent the present stage of human development and therefore probably are only more or less accurate approximations. A people educated differently and better than that now existing can improve greatly that which is. To prepare oneself and to help prepare others so that continued improvements can and will be made seems to be man's highest and most rewarding duty. In fact, it may be his highest and most rewarding privilege.

AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF ACCREDITATION AND CERTIFICATION[1]

BY JOHN P. WYNNE

IN THE JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION for December, 1952, it was announced that the newly organized National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education had held its first meeting on November 14–16, and that the National Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards was inviting national professional organizations to participate in the National Conference on the Certification of Teachers to be held at Miami Beach, June 24–27, 1953. Since the Commission occupies a position of leadership in the development of standards of accreditation and certification, professional organizations now have an opportunity to make contributions to the general movement for the improvement of such standards. Since such contributions will have to be made through participation in the studies directed by the Commission, a general statement of the relationships of the various voluntary agencies on accreditation and certification should be of special interest to members of national professional organizations. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to indicate in the briefest possible way these relationships. For convenience of discussion, it is confined primarily to the problem of accreditation, which, when broadly conceived, involves also the problem of certification.

In the field of education, accreditation is the responsible application of recognized standards as criteria in evaluating practical educational programs and in indicating the level of excellence they have attained. It is designed to encourage self-improvement on the part of educational institutions, to guide inter-institutional relations, to assist employers in rating graduates of institutions, to raise educational standards, and to support local effort in the maintenance of standards. In most countries the standards for educational programs and institutions are established and applied solely by some administrative agency of the central government. But in this country such standards are also established and applied by non-political and voluntary groups whose authority is recognized by those responsible for the development of practical programs.

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[1]This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society in South Bend, Indiana, April, 1952.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The accreditation movement got underway in the United States some 50 years ago. In 1892 the Methodist Episcopal Church began to prepare an official list of colleges affiliated with that denomination. In organizing the University of Chicago, President Harper had a plan of "university affiliations". The North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools and the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, which were organized in 1895, began accrediting educational institutions in 1912. The accreditation of professional schools began with Abraham Flexner's report on medical education in 1910. After 1912, the United States Office of Education (then the United States Bureau of Education) began preparing every four years a bulletin of information about the accreditation given institutions in the United States by recognized agencies. The number of accrediting agencies was greatly increased between 1920 and 1930. Between 1921 and 1923, the American Council on Education undertook a project for the development of uniform standards for use by the Regional Associations, each of which had up to that time developed its own standards independently. During the 1930's, the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools initiated the movement for the qualitative evaluation of institutions based upon research, which is now gradually replacing the older quantitative evaluation based upon the opinions of recognized leaders. In this same period, many other accrediting associations were established. Even as early as 1920 some of the university presidents became alarmed about the increasing power of accrediting agencies and influenced some of the organizations to which their institutions belonged to study ways and means of keeping accrediting associations within "reasonable limits".

In 1939, the Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities and The National Association of State Universities formed a Joint Committee which undertook to prepare a list of accrediting associations with which member institutions "were advised" to have dealings. But the effect of this effort was disappointing to them in that unlisted accrediting associations were not immediately eliminated as they had expected. During World War II, accrediting agencies were not active, but, after the close of the war, a new accreditation movement got underway. The old agencies resumed operations and new groups began to organize for the purpose of accreditation.

In order to deal with this new situation, the Joint Committee on Accrediting established in 1939 was revived and its membership increased. It was then renamed the National Commission on Accrediting and included representatives from the Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities, the National Association of State Universities, the Association of Urban Universities, the Association of American Universities, and the Association of American Colleges. The National Commission was sometimes known as the Gustavson Commission for its chairman, Chancellor Gustavson, of the University of Nebraska. It has now been further extended to include representatives of the American Association of Junior Colleges and the Association of Teacher Education Institutions. It can, therefore, now speak officially for some 1200 institutions.

Another movement toward this unification of accrediting agencies should perhaps also be mentioned. The Federation of Regional Accrediting Associations has now been formed for the primary purpose of issuing a single national list of

all institutions that have met the standards for accreditation of the respective regional associations represented in the Federation. The five regional associations, with one exception, are associations of both colleges and secondary schools, and together they cover the whole country. However, they accredit an institution as a whole without special reference to the particular programs it provides. The National Commission on Accrediting has recently adopted the policy of working through the regional associations and reducing or directing the professional accrediting associations, one of which is the Association of Colleges for Teacher Education.

But almost every profession now has its own accrediting association. There are at least three kinds of associations: the practitioner association, the college association, and the joint-council. The practitioner type consists of an association of practitioners such as the American Medical Association. The college-association type consists of an association of colleges and schools that prepare for particular professions such as the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education. The joint-council type consists of a council in which the different interests involved are represented, such as the National Council on the Accreditation of Teacher Education.

ACCREDITATION OF TEACHER EDUCATION

The foregoing brief account of accrediting agencies is preparatory to a consideration of accreditation in the field of teacher education. An institution may be said to be accredited for teacher education when a State Department recognizes its recommendations for issuing teaching certificates. It may also be accredited by voluntary agencies on the basis of their prescribed standards. Systematic accreditation in teacher education began with the adoption of "Standards for Accrediting Teachers Colleges" by the American Association of Teachers Colleges in 1926. Systematic accrediting procedures have been developed in some states, and something like 1200 teacher-education institutions have been accredited by one or more of the voluntary agencies. However, since criteria of accreditation vary, the term, "accreditation", has no specific meaning.

The American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, in which the American Association of Teachers Colleges, the National Association of Teacher Education Institutions in Metropolitan Districts, and the National Association of Colleges and Departments of Education were combined in 1948, is now the only recognized voluntary accrediting agency in the field of teacher education.[2] However, it is not recognized by all the other voluntary agencies or by all state departments of education, and it has been only temporarily recognized by the Gustavson Commission. Certification authorities of state departments of education are unable to resist political and local pressure and thus cannot maintain professional standards in the field of teacher education. As a result of pressure from above, symbolized in the National Commission on Accrediting and recognition of the weakness of certification authorities in state departments of education, the National Education Association and other associations affiliated with it have now established a National Council on Accreditation of Teacher Education.

Under the sponsorship of the Commission on Teacher Education and Pro-

[2]Since this paper was written, the accreditation function of the AACTE has been transferred to the National Council on Accreditation of Teacher Education.

fessional Standards of the National Education Association, this new agency has been established. It is a joint-council type of agency and consists of twenty-one members representing five different national organizations. Three members represent the National Council of Chief State School Officers, three represent the National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and Certification, six represent the National Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards, six represent the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, and three represent the National School Boards Association. This National Council is designed to formulate standards, to evaluate teacher-education programs on the basis of these standards, and to publish a list of those programs that are found to be acceptable.

The Council may not be fully representative in that students, parents, and institutions in which teacher education is a minor factor are not represented, and in that the rank and file of the teaching profession are not directly represented. It may not meet the requirements of the National Commission on Accrediting and may not, therefore, be recognized by it as an authoritative accrediting agency. But whether it meets these requirements or not or whether it is so recognized or not, it is now a going concern. To become most effective, it needs the support of the National Commission on Accrediting, the regional associations, the universities and liberal arts colleges, the parochial and private school groups, and the state departments of education. Moreover, its complete success will depend upon the sanctions that are enforced. Unless state departments of education, teacher education institutions, and the professional organizations cooperate with the Council in enforcing sanctions, it will not be fully successful. On July 1, 1954, the date set for the Council to begin its accrediting activities, the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education ceased to function as an accrediting agency. The National Council then became the only voluntary agency for accrediting teacher-education programs. Therefore, all associations and institutions interested in teacher education should support this new movement for improving the standards of teacher education.

The success of the Council depends in no small measure upon the results of the effort of the National Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards. It is now directing a nation-wide study for the purpose of developing adequate standards of certification and accreditation. During 1953, it held a series of regional conferences devoted to a study of professional standards. The Commission asked national professional organizations to set up special committees to study certification in their respective fields and to participate in its Eighth Annual National Conference on Teacher Education and Professional Standards held at Miami Beach, Florida, June 24–27, 1953. Therefore, every national professional organization interested in the problem of certification and accreditation in the field of teacher education should prepare to make its contribution to the deliberations of the Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards. The Commission is not only a member of the Council, but it is charged with leadership in the development of professional standards that will later be used by the Council as criteria in its evaluation and accreditation of teacher education programs. The Executive Secretary of the Commission is a consultant to the Council.

The relationships of the recognized voluntary accrediting agencies to one another on the one hand and to professional national organization on the other are

here indicated by means of the diagram shown in Figure 1. The Philosophy of Education Society, as one of these organizations, is given special emphasis for the purpose of illustration. But the same kind of emphasis might have been given to any other professional organization. Although there is nothing new in this summary statement, when supplemented by such a diagram it should be suggestive to the leaders of professional organizations that can contribute to the new movement for the improvement of accreditation and certification in the field of teacher education.


Assn. of Land Grant Colleges and Univ.
Natl. Assn. of State Univ.
Assn. of Urban Univ.
Assn. of American Univ.
Assn. of American Colleges
American Assn. of Junior Colleges
Assn. of Teacher Education Institutions
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ACCREDITING
Federation of Natl. Accrediting Assns. (Regional)
NATIONAL COUNCIL on ACCREDITATION OF TEACHER EDUCATION
American Medical Assn. and others
Natl. Council of Chief State School Officers
Natl. Assn. of Directors of Teacher Education and Certif.
Commission on Teacher Education and Profess. Standards
Amer. Assn. of Colleges for Teacher Education
Natl. School Boards Assn.
Philosophy of Education Society
Other Professional Organizations

FIG. 1.—Place of the Philosophy of Education Society in the Projected Over-All Accreditation Program.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

The Philosophy of Education Society as a national professional organization is interested in the problem of accreditation and certification and is morally obligated to make a special contribution to the development of whatever standards are used by the Council in its evaluation and accreditation of teacher-education programs. Its interest in the problem is indicated by the fact that, in April, 1953, at its regular Annual Conference in St. Louis, it included one program on certification and by the further fact that it later appointed a committee on certification and a committee on professional relations. Its ability to make a peculiar contribution is indicated by the fact that the development and application of educational standards always involve the problem of values, in dealing with which educational philosophers are specialists. Our Society is interested in the problem not merely in order to extend the requirements of philosophy as an indispensable subject in teacher education, but also in order to assist in the development and application of standards wherever philosophical considerations are involved.

The Society has two committees studying the problems of certification and accreditation. The Certification Committee is making a study of practices and beliefs in regard to certification throughout the country with special reference to philosophy of education. The Professional Relations Committee is trying to develop a general consensus with respect to principles of accreditation. Both Committees hope to make sufficient progress to be able to participate effectively in any national conferences on accreditation and certification in which the Society may be invited to participate.

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THE INADEQUACY OF VERBAL TEACHING

BY MOWAT G. FRASER

CAN WE TEACH PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION THROUGH WORDS ALONE—that is, through lectures, books, and discussions? Or do students also need active experiences? If so, what kinds?

Why do some opponents of progressive education, of democracy in politics or educational administration, or of religious faith or tolerance, complete a course in this field more convinced of their prejudices than when they entered? Why do some open-minded students, at the other end of the scale, leap to fantastic conclusions which they later find disastrous? Such students hear the same lectures as others, read the same books, and participate in the same discussions, but emerge with beliefs and interests which would appall their instructors. These deplorable results, it is well known, occur frequently even under nationally known teachers.

Why? Mainly, I believe, for two or three reasons: that the student's associations keep him content with his prejudices; that extreme theories and practices of the opposition antagonize him; and, accordingly, that the associations or practical experiences which he needs have not been provided for him. Let me illustrate by reference to the teaching of educational theories, political philosophy, and metaphysics.

No better illustration can be found than in the teaching of important modern theories of education, like adapting methods to pupils' backgrounds and curricula to their actual needs. Nationally respected lecturers, classroom instructors, writers, and organizations have done their best to teach these theories. Yet, large numbers of students, as well as laymen, to put it mildly, have remained unconvinced.

What can we do? The effects of practice teaching, I believe, give the clue. Apathetic and supercilious students return after even a week or two of this experience popping with tales, questions, ideas, and new interests. What has happened? Concrete tasks have been able to make vivid some problems and theories which words could not.

Two kinds of practice, for example, are especially eye-opening. Trying to help academically bright pupils who are socially maladjusted reveals dramatically the deficiencies in traditional curricula. And trying to aid academically dull pupils who are leaders shows unforgetably that traditional methods with their group assignments and abstract textbook terms are not effective with some pupils of high potential worth.

In England, some of the best teacher-training institutions send students out for a preliminary month of observing schools and helping in the teaching after

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only one week of professional training—with practically no study of psychology or educational theory. The plan has proved valuable, for the students return to college with eager, realistic interest in professional study.

All this may be neutralized, however, if the student sees extreme, unsuccessful practices. A college teacher who advocates theories which cannot be illustrated in practice may open visions to some students but will assuredly antagonize others who most need to be moved. A demonstration teacher who, with the best of theories in mind, lets pupils become slothful or discourteous may make assertive observers deaf to the ablest teaching of those theories.

In political philosophy a similar situation prevails. In the past eighty years when grave economic injustices and needs have arisen along with industrial development, millions of Americans of both major political parties have tried to help correct those conditions through governmental or other co-operative efforts like anti-trust laws, regulations of working conditions, equitable income taxes, co-operatives, labor unions and arbitration, social security, and emergency public works. But other millions of the extreme right or left, including many teachers, think that most of these efforts are either fanatically radical or deplorably conservative. The extreme right remains indifferent to needs. The extreme left jumps to unwarranted theories without testing them in experience. Even as able a man as Norman Thomas now admits, in his most recent book, that capitalism does not have the inherent weaknesses which socialists foresaw, and that socialism has unexpected defects.

Why this ineffective or unsound teaching? The same three reasons seem to apply. Extremely conservative students have been protected against injustices and needs themselves, have associated mainly with other conservatives, or have been appalled at the unrealistic theories advocated by liberals. And neither they nor the extreme liberals have had the practical experiences which alone might have opened their eyes or tested their theories.

What should we do? Is not the answer again to supplement words with practical activities? Send conservatives to the slums to find what unfortunates actually need; and send liberals to business and government to study realistic difficulties.

Nearer home we might well send students to faculty members who suffer under autocratic school or college authorities or to superintendents or college presidents who know the difficulties in democratic administration. For despite several decades not only of lip-service to democracy in education but also of faculty control of educational policies in leading institutions and even of insistence upon democratic practices by accrediting associations, there are many institutions in which faculty members never have the opportunity to formulate or to review a single important policy. There are a few in which mistaken definitions of democracy, like opportunity for a whole staff to determine all policies in detail, like faculty discussion without voting, or like faculty participation only through committees appointed by the administration, block progress. Teaching about democracy is often futile or misleading because it provides no experiences with the real problems of attaining that ideal.

The same general conclusions must be reached concerning the teaching of metaphysics and religion. Here, too, some students, frightened by criticism of revered beliefs, cling more tightly to their convictions, refuse to reason, and see only fallacies in other points of view than their own. At the opposite extreme are so-called liberals who, in their desire to reason fearlessly, fail to see the importance of religious faith to the integration of their own personalities, reject all religion, and in effect fail to understand most metaphysical theories inconsistent with theirs. In the April, 1953, *Atlantic Monthly*, his secretary tells the experience of George Santayana. In 1900 he and his colleagues concluded that religion is inconsistent with science; half a century later he decided that these eminent philosophers were wrong on this fundamental issue. In 1900 they had lacked the experience of testing their theories.

Thus, unless religious conservatives can somehow be encouraged to reason fearlessly, they can not comprehend the significances or even the meanings of materialism, naturalism, pragmatism, or certain kinds of realism. And unless religious liberals experience the need for personal faith which can give inner stability amid great, continuous stress, they can hardly appreciate even the meanings of contrasting theories. In short, the teaching of metaphysics becomes meaningless pedantry for many students unless it encourages them to broaden their associations and activities.

Here, to be sure, we may find ourselves playing with fire. Unless we take care, conservatives who are stimulated to reason fearlessly may reject religion entirely, lose faith in everything, and emerge nervous wrecks. And atheists, faced with crises which awaken them to the need for religion, may leap to extreme, conservative views. Apparently in order to be effective, the teacher of metaphysics must become acquainted with his students individually, suggesting experiences and later discussing results according to individual needs.

Finally, we should not overlook the effects of social trends. Is it mere coincidence that, in the philosophy of education, politics, and religion, there came new conceptions of needs and possibilities shortly after the mid-nineteenth century, and that in the last quarter century eminent liberals have admitted that they had been too extreme and recently have held much more conservative beliefs? No, the social studies have shown us that tremendous developments in science and communication began about a century ago to bring new needs, new insights, and the courage to express both. Extreme theories of progressive education, democracy, socialism, communism, agnosticism, and atheism seemed to many a student, then, to be obviously sound even before they were tested. But shortly after 1900, the tempo of invention and industrial change speeded up at a rate and in ways which could not possibly have been foreseen. Education, politics, and religion began again to be important in new, urgent ways to millions of people. And deficiencies in untested theories began to be evident to all whose associations did not encourage conservatism.

In a world where such changes are inevitable, it is impossible to teach philosophy adequately apart from history. In a world where students' interests and openmindedness depend, in part, upon their experience, it is also impossible to teach it effectively to many students by verbal methods alone.

BOOK REVIEWS

COMMUNITY IN CRISIS: THE ELIMINATION OF SEGREGATION FROM A PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM. By James H. Tipton. New York: Teachers College Bureau of Publications, 1953. 180 pp. $3.75.

Many people of social sensitivity believe that the one area in which we, the people of the United States, are most undemocratic is that of race relations, and especially that of Caucasian-Negroid relations. Moreover, they regard segregation of peoples according to race, nationality, or class as contrary to the democratic principles which we profess, as damaging to our influence abroad and to our position as a leader of the oppressed. Yet, in 1947, "twenty-one states and the District of Columbia had laws that required or permitted segregation of students in the schools." Although the United States Supreme Court has recently handed down a decision making it unconstitutional to have segregated schools, this study remains a very timely and valuable one.

Community in Crisis presents an objective account of the methods by which Central City (actual name is not given) moved from partial segregation to non-segregation in the elementary schools. The ultimate goal was a complete system of non-segregated public schools. Such outcome was the result of several actual and other threatened strikes which demanded complete segregation. It is of value and interest to note the interrelations established between the board of education, the superintendent, principals, teachers, students, parents, city authorities, and civic groups. It is, as the author states, a study in "democratic community growth."

One of the first things done in an attempt to resolve the issues was to make a careful study of the causal tensions. Why did this strike occur in but one of the many districts? What kind of adults and students led it? As answers to these and related questions were compiled, much valuable information and insight into human motives and actions and into community pressures was secured.

School officials learned that they would have to take a definite position on the issues involved. The director of the Bureau, which came to the aid of the school authorities, wrote to the superintendent: " 'It is our conviction that unless the board itself favors serious attention to the problem by the staff and says so, we cannot expect whole-hearted work on the part of the administration and the teachers. Too many of them will wonder when their necks are going to be chopped off.' " Later, in a meeting of the administrative staff, the superintendent said: " 'What we have always done is to avoid issues for as long as possible and it has brought us to this today.' " A lawyer concerned in the situation said: " 'The teachers should come out in the open and take a stand on the issue,' " and added: " 'If teachers haven't enough of the spirit of democracy to fight for what they think is right, they're not fit to be teachers.' "

Support of the citizens of the town was both offered and sought. The Urban League conducted tours through the school and district involved. The League

of Women Voters, together with the teachers, "sponsored a series of community studies of delinquency, recreation, housing and the like. . . . A new Unity Council was formed to foster better human relations in the communuty." Civic organizations conducted a two-day workshop "for the training of leaders in human relations." One of their conclusions was that " 'Methods of working together for the things which the whole community needs will solve the problem of Central City's minorities.' " Support on the part of the mayor, the police department, and the Central City Daily paper was of great help to the school officials.

The administrative-supervisory staff and the teachers learned to work together more effectively than they had in the past. The teachers were requested to set up an advisory group to meet regularly with the superintendent, the principal, and the board. In addressing the teachers, the superintendent said that it was "a great mistake that the teachers had not been asked to help on the first day of the strike." As time passed, the teachers performed an increasingly important role in school management. Two years after the first strike, when the practice of nonsegregated elementary schools was instituted, "for the first time in Central City's public school history, all teachers and administrators participated in a two-day-before-school orientation session."

The students also began to assume a more important role in school management. At the threat of a third strike, "the principal decided to work through the new student council organization, new members of which had just been elected representing, for the first time in the school's history, all homerooms. Also for the first time, the student council membership included Negro boys and girls." A better informed and more responsible student body resulted from this changed practice.

The ultimate outcomes of this student-led strike seem to have been beneficial to both community and school, largely because it was handled with discretion and skill. Some of the gains, in addition to those noted, are that many of the people learned that "all people have got to be considered, even the 'hunkies.' . . . The number of vigorous and dogmatic objectors to board policies was reduced . . ." In a bitter dispute, the parties concerned "had been able to voice their angriest thoughts and yet not come to blows. . . . There was real and healthy growth in the attitude of many students who participated in the strikes leading to improved relations between students and adults." Three years after the strike, its student leader said: " 'Our strike brought the real social problems to the surface and set the stage for working out realistic solutions. Human relations are better in Central City now than in most large cities.' "

As such gains are surveyed, the reader may conclude, as did the author, that "social conflicts may bring benefits along with the pains." Therefore the title of the book appropriately could be *Community in Growth.*

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THE MEANING OF THE GLORIOUS KORAN. Translated by Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall. New York: The New American Library (Mentor Book), 1953. 464 pages.

In considering this translation there can be no question as to its accuracy; it is the only translation approved by the Islamic scriptural authorities at Al-Azhar in Cairo. It remains only to point out and praise some of its excellences.

At the beginning of each chapter (*surah*) there is a short introduction which locates the surah in its place in the sequence in which they were revealed, and which explains the title of the *surah* and such allusions as are not clear from previous passages. This reduces the need for footnotes to a minimum and allows uninterrupted and understanding reading.

In his introduction the translator remarks upon the literalness of his translation, and comparison with other versions confirms the success of this aim. One repeatedly sees naturalness of expression and retention of idiom in this translation, whereas in others there is a loss of this feeling of closeness to the original, even though these others may be accepted as essentially accurate.

The availability of the Pickthall translation of the Koran in this low priced edition makes it possible for many who might never, otherwise, have had contact with the book, to become informed and understanding of much of one of the great world religions. The publishers are to be thanked, and the readers congratulated, for the opportunity.

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PUBLIC EDUCATION UNDER CRITICISM. Edited by W. Winfield Scott and Clyde M. Hill. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954. 414 pages. $6.35.

This book is an anthology representing contemporary criticisms of public education and of answers to adverse criticisms. Consideration of this literary output is sufficient for one to realize that the American people are anything but apathetic about their schools. Concern about the schools, even the fear of the schools on the part of the enemies of democracy, is eloquent testimony of the faith people have in public education as the means through which their aspirations can be realized.

Educators and laymen alike need to be familiar with the current wave of criticism; they face a challenge in handling these criticisms and using them to improve the basic program in the schools. In meeting the challenge, educators and laymen need to understand who the critics are, what they believe are errors either of commission or omission, and why they find in the American public school a target for vigorous and vicious aggression. These issues, then, form the frame of reference for the critical literature herein included.

In the Introduction, the editors classify the critics whose opinions are attaining wide attention: (1) college professors and administrators who have not had formal

training in education but who have given much serious thought to education; (2) professional educators, particularly professors and administrators in colleges and schools of education, with a sprinkling of representatives who hail from other types of institutions, and who decry professional education as an unsightly smear on the academic escutcheon; (3) professional writers such as Dorothy Thompson, and semi-professional magazine writers like Mortimer Smith; and (4) outright enemies of education. It is not amiss to note that many of the critics have no conception of problems arising in public schools from their almost complete democratization. Some have not been in public schools for years, and others have never patronized public schools.

One charge has been directed at classroom methods of teaching children. Here we find the argument that schools have abandoned rigid disciplines and drill experiences and that, as a result, they are deficient in providing character education. It is commonly recognized that the school has had to fulfil many of the functions formerly allotted to the home. Although the school has not sought these responsibilities, the pressures of depression, war, and emergencies have combined to impose added tasks upon the school. Consequently, the schools find themselves beset on both sides—for doing both too much and too little in developing a program that recognizes the whole personality of the pupil.

The charge that the schools are doing a poor job of teaching the fundamental subjects is considered in Chapter IV. "The amount of research which has been devoted to improving the teaching methods, and also the content and organization of the fundamental subjects, is the clearest refutation of the charge that these subjects are not receiving as much attention as they once did," to use the words of Dr. Archibald Anderson.

Chapter VII deals with charges made against teachers and teacher education. Seeing their own school experiences through the halo of pleasant memories, many critics view with suspicion, if not with alarm, departure from practices they have known. In this regard it may be pointed out that failure to keep parents (and college professors) abreast of the times in the psychology supporting changes in school products is responsible for much distrust of the schools. Educators often use tools of communication that are not meaningful, or intelligible, or even helpful to parents when they seek direct answers to direct questions; and naturally parents flounder on the lingo.

In the last chapter, the editors indicate their position with relation to public school criticism. They admit that the present situation is serious, yet they do not view it with alarm. Their conclusion is: "The recent wave of attacks on public education imply that something really is wrong in the relationship between schools and the communities they serve . . . The only promising method of meeting these criticisms is for school people and the citizens in the communities these schools serve to keep the initiative and to work together in a spirit of mutual trust and support on the problem that gravely concerns both parents and teachers, namely, the education of children."

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INQUIRY INTO INQUIRIES: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL THEORY. By Arthur F. Bentley. Boston: Beacon Press, 1954. 365 pp. $6.00.

Starting before the turn of the century, Arthur F. Bentley has written penetrating works in such varied areas as economics, politics, sociology, physical science, mathematics, psychology, and philosophy. His works have been published in the United States, France, England, and Germany. *The Process of Government* (1908) has been fairly described as a "world classic." *Behavior, Knowledge, Fact* (1935) is a powerful, systematic analysis of the nature of a social fact. Many of his articles are regarded as historical advances in the formulation or analysis of the problems on which they are focused.

John Dewey in philosophy, P. W. Bridgman in physical science, and George Lundberg in sociology are only a few of the scholars in diverse fields who have been greatly influenced or stimulated by Bentley's writings. For example, in the preface to his *Logic*, Dewey acknowledges his special intellectual indebtedness to Bentley, along with Peirce and Mead. And in 1949, Dewey and Bentley published their *Knowing and the Known*, probably the most explicit formulation to date of basic terms and postulates in experimental logic.

Inquiry into Inquiries is edited and ably introduced by Sidney Ratner. It presents in chronological order 20 essays written by Bentley from 1910 to 1950. Some of the chapters (essays) are in unfinished form; a few are but rough drafts. About a third of the material consists of hitherto unpublished manuscripts. Most of the essays, however, have appeared in such technical journals as *Philosophy of Science*, *Journal of Psychology*, *Journal of Philosophy*, and *The Sociological Review*. In one way or another all the essays work toward bringing the theory of knowing in the social sciences into harmony with modern scientific practice.

Comparing this work with Dewey's *Logic* and with *Knowing and the Known*, one notes that no new basic terms or postulates are formulated in this work. But ideas found elsewhere are here strongly supported by new factual materials and new lines of reasoning. In some of the essays, some of these ideas are even more operationally defined than in *Knowing and the Known*. Moreover, these concepts are rigorously and illuminatingly applied in the analysis of varied problems and theories of knowing.

From the pages of the book there emerges a picture of a learned and questing scholar trying to free social studies from the historical incubus of mind-versus-matter, this force-versus-that force approaches. To replace the "givenness" of ontological assumptions, Bentley offers us the "forever gettingness" of the transactional approach, a vision of continuing inquiry wherein namings and disjunctions are postulations—not hypostatizations—and the act of inquiry is not a registration or creation of reality but a consciously demarcated and manipulated aspect of a more inclusive natural process. In place of reductionism and dualism, and the isolated forces, actors, and traits which they engender, Bentley offers us a full contextual or field view. His explanation of why, when a man has a little "personal" problem, the "action that ensues is not that of an 'individual man,' any more than a bit of tide movement in the ocean is the separately initiated motion of a particular drop of water" (p. 22), is a masterpiece of analysis.

Bentley applies his major concepts to, and derives them from, a wide range of materials. His knowledge is comprehensive; his turn of mind is integrative.

Within the space of a few pages, basic terms and objects of diverse disciplines get analyzed and interrelated as they are brought to bear on a specific problem. Genes, atoms, stimuli, souls, imaginary numbers, Newton's space and the sociologist's space, etc., are seen in enlightening connectivities.

Among those whose ideas are analyzed by Bentley are I. Pavlov, A. Einstein, R. Carnap, W. James, P. W. Bridgman, J. Dewey, and F. Kaufmann. The author's analyses are almost always fine, precise. He avoids stereotypes and lumpy namings. While condemning most aspects of behaviorist psychology, he is full of praise for other aspects. While generally honoring Dewey highly, he does not hesitate to lay bare what he regards as deficiencies in Dewey's treatment of certain topics. The book is worth reading if only as a lesson on how to have an independent mind without surrendering to a vapid eclecticism.

It might be added, rather parenthetically, that the author, as usual, is often caustic and contentious. Apparently, one of the few historical lessons Bentley has not learned is the intellectual value of civility, sympathy, and operational (not just postulated) humility.

Those interested in understanding the relation of experimental logic to social inquiries will probably find this book invaluable. Those concerned with the fundamentals of the relations between the knower and the known, the individual and society, the universal and the particular, content and method, aims and means, will find this work most helpful indeed. Those who wonder whether there can be a sociology of knowledge which does not lapse into cultural relativism or subjectivism will find one carefully formulated answer in this book. Incidentally, persons who are unfamiliar with Bentley's terminology may find that reading some of the later chapters first (especially chapters 20 and 16) will facilitate the reading of earlier chapters. It is interesting to note that the clearest formulation of basic assumptions comes after they have been used for many years.

Sidney Ratner states that "the cumulative impact of these essays rivals that of such works as John Dewey's *Philosophy and Civilization* and William James's *Essays in Radical Empiricism*" (p. ix). This may be a bit of an overstatement. But certainly this work is one of the most important publications in philosophy in recent years.

Martin Levit
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POWER OF WORDS. By Stuart Chase in collaboration with Marian T. Chase. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954. 308 pp. $3.95.

Communication today is an outstanding problem, as never before, and Stuart Chase presents in this book a number of new developments in this important field. Following the spirit of his earlier volume, *The Tyranny of Words*, he discusses semantics as well as linguistics, cybernetics, listening, group dynamics, tools for writers, and words and the world view.

This last topic is most interesting to the philosopher of education. Quoting Benjamin Lee Whorf, whose work on languages has influenced Chase greatly, the author indicates that, in using words, "a person notices or neglects types of relationships and phenomena" and "channels his reasoning." In the Hopi language the word for "wave" gives a closer equivalence to actual physics of wave

motion than does ours. Likewise, in this language, it is not habitual, as it is in ours, to raise the question of "whether things in a distant village exist at the same present moment as things in one's own village." Thus, Hopi "avoids the idea of *simultaneity*, which has plagued Western scientists for generations and was only banished by relativity. The thoughts of a Hopi about events always include *both* space and time. . . . For a westerner really to understand relativity, he must abandon his spoken tongue altogether and take to the special language of calculus."

A unique view of nature and the cosmos tends to be imposed upon us by the peculiarities of the language we have developed. Some users of language are closer to us than others; to some extent languages may be calibrated with ours. This is not true of Hopi or Chinese, which follow a different logic from the subject-predicate logic so influential upon Kant. "An intelligent Chinese gentleman does not know what Kant is talking about—unless he learns some Western tongue in which to read Kant's words."

The Eskimo breaks down our word "snow" so that he has many words for the various kinds of snow. The language he uses enables him to cope with the world differently from the way we cope with it. "Linguistic relativity makes it clear that Newton took his concepts of Absolute Space and Absolute Time, not so much out of profound cogitation, as out of the language he spoke."

Chase speculates that the Chinese may absorb the Russian communists largely because of the linguistic advantages the Chinese have over the Russians. He concludes his chapter on "The World View" by suggesting that there is "no reason to suppose that English . . . or any other Western language . . . is the ultimate in a communication system." He goes on in the book to indicate that scientists "have erected new concepts such as the operational definition" and, in certain respects, have done a rather spectacular job of housecleaning. Chase is encouraging in that he shows much that has been accomplished, but he also opens up vistas into areas in which problems are still manifold.

Alexander P. Cappon
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GREAT HUMAN ISSUES OF OUR TIMES. By Harold Benjamin, Kenneth Cooper, Willard Goslin, Clifton L. Hall, Claude Chadwick, James L. Hymes, Jr., Henry H. Hill and William Van Til. Bureau of Publications, George Peabody College For Teachers, Nashville, Tennessee, 1953. pp. vii, 113. No index.

This Faculty Lecture Series was presented in the summer of 1953 ". . . on the campus green under the stars with the flood-lit columns of the Social-Religious Building as a background" and to overflow audiences. Romantic Tennessee summers are set in a larger context of educational thorns: legal prohibition of the teaching of evolution, segregation and desegregation, and a persistent lack of positive national publicity for the State internationally well-known for the educational T.V.A. experiment. Within these several contexts, a group of educators present an earnest set of inquiries into Fear, Liberty, Freedom, Philosophical Diversity, Truth and Value.

We may take issue with Benjamin, one of several authors of the lectures, when he states that "given a description of a people's culture," a student of comparative

education "can predict the kind of schooling they will want and need." (p. 4) We may underline Cooper's conviction "that liberty is the first value, the condition necessary for the only kind of life that is worth living." (p. 29) And we may be skeptical of Goslin's faith in a universal education unless its kind is carefully specified. Nevertheless, the reader will find these statements to be in the tradition of the George Peabody College For Teachers where the final answers to the *Great Human Issues* have not been discovered and where there is, rather, a willingness to stake out the road to intelligent inquiry.

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PUBLIC EDUCATION AND ITS CRITICS. By V. T. Thayer. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. 170 pp. $2.50. (Kappa Delta Phi Lecture.)

Critics of public education seem to be increasing in numbers and vehemence of utterance. Informed and unbiased criticism intended to effect desirable changes is beneficial and should be appreciated. Only thus can a maximum of desirable growth and efficiency on the part of an institution or individual be attained.

Some recent criticisms reflect lack of information concerning the work of the public schools (pp. 107–12). Such mistaken and unfounded judgments are serious because of their effects on the public and educators. They are much less objectionable and detrimental, however, than are the prejudiced and often dishonest arguments made by representatives of certain religious, economic, and patriotic organizations. These appear to be intent on crippling and perhaps even destroying that system of schools which many of us have come to regard as uniquely democratic and American, as a necessity for the perpetuation of our way of life (pp. 1–72).

Both types of criticism emphasize the need for friends of public schools to be much better informed concerning:

1. What are the basic assumptions on which our public school system is based?
2. How effectively is it teaching the necessary skills, content, and attitudes?
3. What curriculum and teaching procedures are most conducive to a perpetuation and enrichment of the cultural heritage?
4. Who are the critics and what, if any, are their vested interests?
5. How valid are their claims and judgments?

Only as answers are secured to these and similar questions can beneficial practices be retained and desirable reforms be made. Only thus can critics be answered effectively and the public become better informed concerning education with regard to its purposes, its present quality and efficiency, and the changes needed if future citizens are to be prepared to live richly, effectively, and securely in a rapidly evolving and sometimes chaotic world. This little book by Mr. Thayer is a valuable handbook for those who desire such information.

F. L. Shoemaker
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